## Facts

- David Earl Fleming drove on the George Washington Memorial Parkway in northern Virginia while extremely intoxicated.
- Witnesses and police observed Fleming driving approximately 70–100 mph in areas with a generally 45 mph speed limit.
- Fleming repeatedly crossed into northbound lanes to bypass traffic, forcing oncoming vehicles to take evasive action to avoid head-on collisions.
- A pursuing officer observed Fleming continue for several-tenths of a mile in opposing lanes separated by a raised concrete median, still at high speed.
- About six miles after he was first observed, Fleming lost control on a sharp curve, slid into the northbound lanes, struck a curb, and collided with a car driven by Margaret Jacobsen Haley traveling in the opposite direction.
- At impact, Fleming was estimated to be traveling 70–80 mph in a 30 mph zone.
- Haley died at the scene from multiple severe injuries.
- Fleming’s blood alcohol concentration was measured at approximately 0.31 at the hospital.
- Fleming was convicted in federal district court of second-degree murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111 and appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether a non-purposeful vehicular homicide caused by an intoxicated driver’s extreme reckless conduct can satisfy “malice aforethought” and support a conviction for second-degree murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111.
2. Whether the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find malice aforethought, rather than only the lesser mental state associated with manslaughter.
3. Whether the district court committed reversible error in evidentiary rulings related to Fleming’s intoxication and driving behavior.

## Decision

- The Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction for second-degree murder.
- The court held that “malice aforethought” under 18 U.S.C. § 1111 does not require an intent to kill or personal animus toward the victim.
- The court concluded that malice may be inferred from conduct demonstrating a depraved disregard for human life—recklessness and wantonness so extreme that it is treated as equivalent to awareness of a very high risk of death or serious bodily harm.
- The court ruled that Fleming’s prolonged, high-speed, wrong-way driving while severely intoxicated permitted the jury to find malice and to classify the homicide as murder rather than manslaughter.
- The court rejected Fleming’s evidentiary challenges.

## Legal Principles

- “Malice aforethought” for federal murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111 includes killings committed without intent to kill when the defendant’s conduct manifests a depraved disregard for human life.
- Malice does not require ill will, hatred, or enmity; it may be shown when a defendant intentionally engages in conduct that he knows creates a very high risk of death or serious bodily injury.
- The distinction between involuntary manslaughter and second-degree murder in reckless-homicide cases turns on the degree of risk and indifference: ordinary gross negligence or inadvertent risk creation supports manslaughter, while extreme recklessness and wantonness can support malice and murder.
- In vehicular homicide cases, intoxication combined with additional aggravating conduct (e.g., sustained excessive speed and deliberate entry into oncoming traffic) may support an inference of malice.

## Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit held that an intoxicated driver’s non-purposeful killing can constitute second-degree murder when the driving conduct is so extreme—sustained high-speed, wrong-way driving while severely intoxicated—that a jury may infer malice aforethought from a depraved disregard for human life.


United States v. Fleming, 739 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1984)