## Facts

- Ronald Fulbright, a Montana farmer facing foreclosure, filed for bankruptcy protection, but his attempt to obtain relief failed.
- Judge John Peterson, a U.S. Bankruptcy Judge, handled matters in Fulbright’s bankruptcy case and later recused himself.
- On April 16, 1993, shortly after the recusal but before the bankruptcy case was dismissed, Fulbright mailed Judge Peterson a “Notice and Demand for Declaration of Judge’s Impartiality” accusing the judge of crimes including sedition, treason, bank fraud, and armed robbery.
- The bankruptcy case was dismissed on May 10, 1993. The appeal period ran for ten days from dismissal.
- On June 2, 1993—23 days after dismissal—Fulbright filed in the bankruptcy court a “Citizens’ Arrest Warrant for Citizens’ Arrest,” which purported to authorize peace officers to arrest Judge Peterson.
- Fulbright was indicted in federal district court for conspiracy to impede or injure a federal officer (18 U.S.C. § 372) and obstruction of justice by intimidating or injuring a federal officer (18 U.S.C. § 1503) (with an additional related obstruction count).
- At trial, Fulbright admitted sending and filing the documents but denied he intended to intimidate or harass, claiming he was trying to affect the foreclosure/bankruptcy outcome.
- The district court instructed the jury that it could convict on obstruction based on either the April “Notice” or the June “Warrant,” and also gave a deliberate-ignorance (Jewell) instruction.
- The jury convicted Fulbright, and the court imposed a 27-month prison sentence. Because the jury returned a general verdict, it did not specify which document(s) it relied on for the obstruction conviction(s).
- Fulbright appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the district court erred by giving a Jewell deliberate-ignorance instruction on “knowledge” on this record.
2. Whether Fulbright’s “Notice” and/or his later-filed “Citizens’ Arrest Warrant” could qualify as a corrupt “endeavor” to obstruct the due administration of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1503, given the timing relative to Judge Peterson’s recusal, the dismissal of the bankruptcy case, and the expiration of the appeal period.
3. Whether a general verdict could stand when the jury was instructed it could convict under § 1503 based on either of two acts, where at least one act lacked the required connection to the administration of justice.
4. Whether Fulbright’s filings were protected speech or instead constituted unprotected intimidation or threats aimed at interfering with a federal judge’s official work.

## Decision

- The Ninth Circuit held the Jewell deliberate-ignorance instruction was improperly given because the proof did not support that Fulbright purposely avoided confirming a fact; at most, the record showed reckless avoidance, and Jewell cannot be used to supply “knowledge” in place of the required mental state.
- The court held that § 1503 obstruction requires a sufficient connection between the defendant’s conduct and an actual, ongoing (or at least still-live) judicial proceeding or the judge’s performance of judicial duties in that proceeding.
- Applying that requirement, the court concluded that the post-dismissal “Citizens’ Arrest Warrant” filed after the bankruptcy case ended (and after the appeal period expired) could not support a § 1503 conviction tied to that concluded matter.
- Because the jury was permitted to convict on obstruction based on either the April “Notice” or the June “Warrant,” and the verdict did not reveal which theory the jury used, the court reversed the affected obstruction conviction(s) and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its ruling.
- The court otherwise affirmed the portions of the judgment not infected by the instructional and § 1503 theory error, and remanded for resentencing as needed.

## Legal Principles

- A Jewell deliberate-ignorance instruction is proper only when the evidence supports that the defendant suspected a high probability of a fact and intentionally avoided learning that fact; reckless or negligent lack of awareness does not justify the instruction.
- Jewell does not allow the government to replace proof of the required mental state with an inference that the defendant “knew” his conduct was unlawful.
- Liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 requires a corrupt effort to influence, intimidate, or impede the administration of justice, and it must be tied to a live judicial proceeding or to an officer’s performance of official duties connected to that proceeding.
- When the jury is instructed that it may convict on a general verdict based on alternative acts, and one alternative is legally insufficient, the conviction cannot stand if it is impossible to know the jury did not rely on the invalid alternative.
- The First Amendment protects harsh disagreement with judges, but it does not protect communications intended to threaten or intimidate federal officials in a way that interferes with their official work.

## Conclusion

United States v. Fulbright held that the district court improperly gave a Jewell deliberate-ignorance instruction and that § 1503 obstruction cannot rest on a “citizens’ arrest” filing made after the underlying bankruptcy proceeding ended and the appeal period expired; because the jury could have relied on that invalid theory under a general verdict, the Ninth Circuit reversed the affected obstruction conviction(s), affirmed the remainder, and remanded for further proceedings and resentencing.


United States v. Fulbright, 105 F.3d 443 (1997)