## Facts

- Yuri Garcia and Francisco Valentin participated in a cocaine-trafficking conspiracy prosecuted in the Southern District of New York.
- A cooperating conspirator, Alejandro Tejada, described repeated multi-kilogram cocaine shipments totaling well over 150 kilograms; drug records corroborated approximately 235 kilograms.
- The government presented cooperator testimony, recorded calls, surveillance, seizures, and documentary drug records.
- DEA Agent Paul Klemick testified about investigative steps and opined that Garcia was Valentin’s “partner” in receiving cocaine and that Garcia helped test cocaine quality, stating this reflected what the investigation determined.
- Garcia was convicted after a jury trial; Valentin pleaded guilty to the conspiracy and a substantive cocaine distribution/possession count.
- The district court sentenced Garcia to 292 months, finding at least 150 kilograms and applying a supervisory-role enhancement; Valentin received a comparable Guidelines-based sentence calculated on judge-found facts under then-mandatory Guidelines.

## Issues

1. Whether admitting Agent Klemick’s “partner” characterization as lay opinion under Federal Rule of Evidence 701 was error and, if so, whether it was harmless.
2. Whether sentences imposed under mandatory Guidelines based on judicial fact-finding violated the Sixth Amendment after *Booker*, requiring remand.
3. Whether the district court’s drug-quantity and role findings were supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
4. Whether Valentin received ineffective assistance of counsel from the failure to challenge the sentencing findings as unsupported by a preponderance of the evidence.

## Decision

- The court held the admission of Agent Klemick’s “partner” opinion as Rule 701 lay testimony was erroneous because Rule 701’s predicates were not satisfied.
- The evidentiary error was harmless because the challenged opinion was cumulative of other evidence, the government did not emphasize it in summation, and proof of Garcia’s role was overwhelming.
- The court affirmed both defendants’ convictions.
- Applying *Booker* and the Second Circuit’s *Crosby* procedure, the court remanded both sentences for the district court to determine whether it would have imposed materially different sentences under advisory Guidelines.
- The court upheld the district court’s drug-quantity and role findings as supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
- The court rejected Valentin’s ineffective-assistance claim because any preponderance-based objection would have lacked merit.

## Legal Principles

- Rule 701 does not permit a case agent to offer lay opinion that summarizes a collective investigation and relies on specialized narcotics knowledge; such conclusions fall within Rule 702 or risk improper commentary on culpability.
- Improper admission of law-enforcement opinion testimony may be harmless where independent evidence of guilt is strong, the testimony is cumulative, and the prosecution does not exploit the error.
- After *Booker*, judicial fact-finding by a preponderance of the evidence may inform advisory Guidelines calculations, but sentencing under a mandatory Guidelines regime based on such findings constitutes error requiring *Crosby*-type remand.
- Counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise futile objections where the record supports the sentencing findings under the applicable standard of proof.

## Conclusion

The Second Circuit ruled that a DEA agent’s conclusory “partnership” opinion was improperly admitted as lay testimony but did not affect the verdict, affirmed the convictions, and remanded for the district court to reconsider the sentences under advisory Guidelines consistent with *Booker* and *Crosby*.


United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201 (2d Cir. 2005)