## Facts

- The City of Chicago required permits and inspections for sewer and house-drain work performed by private contractors, and city inspectors were paid salaries rather than per‑inspection fees.
- Fourteen House Drain Inspectors in Chicago’s Department of Sewers were indicted after the government alleged they accepted cash and other benefits from private sewer contractors in connection with required inspections.
- The government charged that the inspectors, acting through their city office, conducted the affairs of the Department of Sewers through a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of RICO, and also committed extortion under color of official right in violation of the Hobbs Act.
- The RICO charges relied on alleged violations of Illinois state law, including Illinois bribery and Illinois official misconduct, as the state-law offenses supplying the racketeering predicates.
- Before trial, the inspectors sought to strike references to the Illinois official-misconduct statute from the indictment, arguing that official misconduct is not listed as a racketeering predicate in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) and therefore could not support RICO liability.
- Following a jury trial in federal district court, eight inspectors (including Hensley Garner and others) were convicted of RICO violations and Hobbs Act extortion.
- On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the convicted inspectors challenged the use of Illinois official misconduct as a RICO predicate and raised additional objections, including joinder/severance, indictment sufficiency, instructions, evidentiary rulings, and proof of the charged conspiracy and extortion.

## Issues

1. Whether violations of the Illinois official-misconduct statute may be treated as “bribery” in the generic sense incorporated into RICO, and thus may serve as predicate acts under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
2. Whether the district court erred in denying motions to strike from the indictment references to the Illinois official-misconduct statute.
3. Whether joinder of multiple inspectors in a single trial was proper under Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b), and whether severance was required under Rule 14 due to alleged prejudice from the scope of the case.
4. Whether Hobbs Act extortion “under color of official right” required proof that the inspectors solicited or induced payments, or whether knowing receipt of payments connected to official duties was enough.
5. Whether the indictment, jury instructions, evidentiary rulings, and the evidence as a whole were sufficient to support the RICO and Hobbs Act convictions.

## Decision

- The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions.
- The court held that Illinois official misconduct—when it involves accepting payments tied to official action—falls within RICO’s generic category of “bribery,” so it may be used as a RICO predicate offense under § 1961(1).
- Because the official-misconduct allegations could qualify as racketeering activity in the generic sense, the district court did not err in refusing to strike references to the Illinois statute from the indictment.
- The court rejected challenges to joinder and severance, concluding the government alleged a single overall scheme and the defendants did not show the kind of concrete trial prejudice that would require separate trials.
- On the Hobbs Act, the court followed Seventh Circuit precedent that extortion under color of official right is satisfied by a public official’s knowing receipt of payments connected to official acts; proof of solicitation or inducement was not required.
- The court also rejected the remaining challenges to the indictment, instructions, evidentiary rulings, and sufficiency of the evidence, and left the jury’s verdicts intact.

## Legal Principles

- RICO’s list of state-law predicates in § 1961(1) uses generic labels (such as “bribery”); a state offense qualifies if its elements and character fit the generic category, even if the state uses a different statutory name.
- A state “official misconduct” offense can qualify as RICO “bribery” when the conduct involves corrupt payments aimed at influencing official action or compromising the integrity of public office.
- Under Seventh Circuit law, Hobbs Act extortion “under color of official right” is established when a public official knowingly receives payments not due in connection with official acts; the government need not prove the official affirmatively demanded the payment.
- Joinder of defendants is proper when the indictment alleges participation in the same series of acts constituting a single scheme; severance requires a strong showing that a joint trial caused concrete and uncurable prejudice.
- An indictment is sufficient if it states the elements of the charged crimes, gives adequate notice to prepare a defense, and allows the defendant to plead the judgment as a bar to later prosecution for the same conduct.

## Conclusion

United States v. Garner affirmed RICO and Hobbs Act convictions of Chicago sewer inspectors who accepted payments from contractors connected to required inspections, holding that Illinois official misconduct could function as “bribery” for RICO predicate purposes and that Hobbs Act liability did not depend on proof that the officials solicited the payments.


United States v. Garner, 837 F.2d 1404 (1987)