## Facts

- Leroy George was federally prosecuted for sexual abuse of his 12-year-old stepdaughter in Indian country.
- An indictment charged three incidents of intercourse in 1988.
- At trial, the victim identified George and described the assaults, but could not recall approximate dates for two counts.
- A physician examined the victim about five months after the last charged assault; over objection, the physician testified that the victim identified George during the examination.
- A Navajo tribal investigator interviewed the victim six days after the medical exam; over objection, the investigator testified that the victim specified dates for two charged incidents.
- George was convicted on three counts and sentenced to 264 months’ imprisonment.
- After conviction, the victim recanted; the district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied George’s motion for a new trial.

## Issues

1. Whether admitting a treating physician’s testimony that the child victim identified the abuser violated the Confrontation Clause or was admissible under the medical-diagnosis-and-treatment hearsay exception.
2. Whether admitting an investigator’s testimony repeating the victim’s hearsay statements specifying offense dates violated the Confrontation Clause.
3. Whether the government improperly used impeachment testimony as substantive evidence, and whether denial of a new trial based on the victim’s recantation was an abuse of discretion.

## Decision

- The Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions and the denial of the motion for a new trial.
- The court held that admitting the physician’s testimony relaying the victim’s identification did not violate the Confrontation Clause and was admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 803(4) in the context of child sexual abuse treatment.
- The court held that admitting the investigator’s testimony about the victim’s date statements did not violate the Confrontation Clause, particularly because the victim testified and was cross-examined at trial.
- The court found no reversible error from the challenged impeachment evidence.
- The court held the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the recantation and denying a new trial.

## Legal Principles

- Confrontation Clause analysis and hearsay admissibility are related but not coextensive; Confrontation Clause claims are reviewed de novo.
- Under Fed. R. Evid. 803(4), statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment are admissible when reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment; in child sexual abuse cases, the perpetrator’s identity may be pertinent to treatment.
- When the declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination, admission of additional hearsay versions of the declarant’s statements is less likely to create a Confrontation Clause violation, and cumulative hearsay is less likely to be prejudicial.
- A party may not use impeachment as a pretext to place otherwise inadmissible evidence before the jury; reversal requires prejudicial error under the governing evidentiary rules.
- Motions for new trial based on newly discovered evidence are reviewed for abuse of discretion; recantations are treated with extreme suspicion, and credibility determinations after an evidentiary hearing are generally left to the trial court.

## Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit upheld George’s child sexual abuse convictions, ruling that the victim’s identification of the abuser to a physician could be admitted as reasonably pertinent to medical diagnosis and treatment and that repeating date-related statements through an investigator did not violate the Confrontation Clause where the victim testified and was cross-examined; it also affirmed the trial court’s rejection of a post-verdict recantation and denial of a new trial.


United States v. George, 960 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1992)