## Facts

- Federal agents investigated a cocaine-distribution operation involving a Chicago supplier, Robert Romero, and a Milwaukee reseller known on intercepted calls as “Guero.”
- Agents believed Nicolas Gomez was “Guero,” but Gomez contended the voice could have been his brother-in-law, Victor Reyes, who lived in the same residence.
- On September 3, 2010, agents surveilled Romero travel from Chicago to Milwaukee, park near Gomez’s residence, and briefly meet with Gomez at Romero’s car.
- Agents later searched Romero’s vehicle and found approximately a quarter kilogram of cocaine in the trunk.
- The prosecution introduced more than 50 recorded calls between Romero and “Guero” discussing cocaine transactions.
- Weeks after the charged conspiracy, agents arrested Gomez and found a small quantity of cocaine in his bedroom.
- Over objection, the district court admitted the bedroom-cocaine evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) for the stated purpose of proving identity (that Gomez was “Guero”).
- Gomez was convicted in federal district court and sentenced to concurrent 84-month terms; a divided appellate panel affirmed, and the Seventh Circuit reheard the case en banc to clarify Rule 404(b) doctrine.

## Issues

1. What analytical framework governs admissibility of “other acts” evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) in the Seventh Circuit?
2. Under the proper framework, was the cocaine found in Gomez’s bedroom admissible to prove identity?

## Decision

- The en banc court replaced its prior multi-factor Rule 404(b) test with a rules-based approach grounded in Rules 401, 403, and 404(b).
- The court held that other-acts evidence is admissible only if it is supported by a clearly articulated, propensity-free chain of reasoning connecting the act to a non-character purpose.
- The court concluded the bedroom-cocaine evidence was improperly admitted because its relevance to identity depended on an impermissible propensity inference.
- The court found the error harmless in light of strong independent evidence linking Gomez to “Guero” and affirmed the convictions.

## Legal Principles

- Rule 404(b) bars other-acts evidence when its probative value depends on an inference of criminal propensity or character.
- A proponent must specify the disputed fact at issue and explain how the other act tends to prove that fact through a propensity-free chain of reasoning; a generic label (e.g., “identity” or “intent”) is insufficient.
- Similarity and temporal proximity are not independent checkboxes; they are relevance considerations whose importance depends on the asserted non-propensity purpose.
- Even when Rule 404(b) permits a non-propensity use, the court must separately apply Rule 403 and exclude evidence whose unfair-prejudice risk substantially outweighs probative value.
- Erroneous admission of other-acts evidence does not require reversal if the government shows the error was harmless given the untainted proof.

## Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit clarified that Rule 404(b) demands a concrete, propensity-free explanation for how other-acts evidence proves a material issue and reaffirmed that Rule 403 remains an independent constraint; applying that approach, it deemed the other-acts evidence inadmissible but upheld the convictions as harmless error.


United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc)