## Facts

- Federal prosecutors charged Evelyn Gonzalez with conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846.
- The government presented wiretap and surveillance evidence of a cocaine-distribution operation involving Gonzalez, her common-law husband Arquimedes Morban, and José Padua, operating between New York City and Delaware.
- On July 6, 2001, police arrested Morban while he was transporting two kilograms of cocaine in his car.
- Gonzalez testified as the sole defense witness and sought to minimize her role, stating that before Morban’s arrest she acted only as a translator during a single phone call.
- Gonzalez claimed that after Morban’s arrest Padua threatened to kill her and her family unless Morban’s drug debts were repaid, which she argued compelled her conduct.
- On cross-examination, Gonzalez admitted she did not contact law enforcement for help, stating she believed police would not listen and she did not want to provide evidence against Morban.
- Gonzalez also acknowledged awareness of Morban’s drug activity before the alleged threats, including knowledge during a trip to Delaware that he was collecting drug proceeds and distributing drugs.
- Recorded calls between Gonzalez and Padua were introduced to show she actively coordinated collection of drug debts and other conspiracy-related activity.

## Issues

1. Whether Gonzalez presented sufficient evidence to require a jury instruction on duress/coercion.
2. Whether the district court erred by refusing a “single transaction” instruction asserting her conduct was an isolated deal rather than conspiracy participation.
3. Whether, under the rule of lenity, the court erred in sentencing based on a drug quantity greater than the quantity specifically found by the jury, and what remedy applied after Booker.

## Decision

- The Second Circuit affirmed the conviction.
- The court held the district court properly refused a duress/coercion instruction because Gonzalez failed to provide sufficient evidence on required elements, including lack of a reasonable opportunity to escape the threatened harm.
- The court held the district court properly refused a “single transaction” instruction because the evidence supported knowing participation in an ongoing conspiracy rather than an isolated transaction.
- The court rejected the rule-of-lenity challenge and affirmed the Sentencing Guidelines drug-quantity determination used at sentencing.
- The court remanded for the limited purpose of allowing the district court to determine whether it would resentence Gonzalez under an advisory Guidelines regime consistent with Booker and Crosby.

## Legal Principles

- A defendant is entitled to a requested defense instruction only if the evidence, viewed in the defendant’s favor, would permit a reasonable jury to find for the defendant on each element of the defense.
- Duress requires evidence of (1) an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury, (2) a well-grounded fear the threat will be carried out, and (3) no reasonable opportunity to escape the threatened harm; failure to seek available help may defeat the defense.
- Conspiracy liability turns on knowing agreement to participate in a joint criminal venture; a “single transaction” theory does not apply where the evidence shows coordinated, repeated conduct consistent with conspiracy participation.
- For pre-Booker sentences, appellate courts may affirm Guidelines findings yet order a limited remand for the district court to decide whether it would impose a materially different sentence under advisory Guidelines.

## Conclusion

The Second Circuit affirmed Gonzalez’s conspiracy conviction and upheld the trial court’s refusal to instruct on duress and a “single transaction” theory, finding the evidence showed voluntary participation and available alternatives to continued crime. It also affirmed the drug-quantity Guidelines determination and rejected the rule-of-lenity argument, but ordered a limited remand so the district court could decide whether to resentence under the advisory post-Booker framework.


United States v. Gonzalez, 407 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2005)