## Facts

- Great Lakes contracted with Coastal Marine Towing to tow dredging equipment, including long dredge pipes, across Florida waters, using Coastal’s tugs and Great Lakes’ assist tugs.
- While transiting the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary, a pipe raft dragged on the seabed, creating an approximately 13-mile “pipe scar.”
- A navigational error led the tug Captain Joe to run aground in shallow water; Great Lakes’ assist tug Cavalier State was tied to Captain Joe during the incident.
- A high-tide refloating plan using the tug’s power and Cavalier State succeeded but caused additional seabed disturbance, including a channel and a “blowhole.”
- The grounding damaged about 7,495 square meters of sea bottom, including seagrasses and coral.
- NOAA, as trustee under the National Marine Sanctuaries Act (NMSA), developed restoration alternatives for the grounding site: no action, regrading, and imported fill; the government preferred imported fill.
- After a bench trial, the district court held Great Lakes strictly liable under the NMSA, awarded compensatory restoration (interim lost use) and certain monitoring costs, but selected “no action” as the primary restoration for the grounding site.
- Great Lakes appealed the federal government’s authority to sue over state-owned submerged lands and challenged strict liability and denial of a statutory third-party defense; the United States cross-appealed the choice of “no action” for primary restoration.

## Issues

1. Whether the United States may recover NMSA damages for injury to sanctuary resources located on state-owned submerged lands.
2. Whether NMSA § 1443(a)(1) imposes strict liability for injury to sanctuary resources, and whether Great Lakes established the statutory third-party defense under § 1443(a)(3)(A).
3. Whether the district court erred in approving a no-action primary restoration plan for the grounding site based on its understanding of expert recovery testimony.

## Decision

- The court affirmed that the United States may recover damages under the NMSA for injury to “sanctuary resources” even when the seabed is state-owned.
- The court affirmed strict liability against Great Lakes under NMSA § 1443(a)(1) and affirmed rejection of the § 1443(a)(3)(A) third-party defense.
- The court affirmed the use of Habitat Equivalency Analysis to calculate compensatory restoration for interim lost ecological services and upheld the related scientific evidence.
- The court vacated the portion of the judgment selecting “no action” as primary restoration for the grounding site and remanded for further findings and reconsideration because the district court misinterpreted the 70-year recovery evidence.

## Legal Principles

- Under the NMSA, liability runs to the United States for injury to “sanctuary resources,” and state ownership of submerged lands does not bar federal recovery for sanctuary resource damage.
- NMSA § 1443(a)(1) imposes strict liability when a person’s conduct injures, destroys, or causes the loss of sanctuary resources, supporting recovery for primary restoration and compensatory restoration (including interim lost use).
- The NMSA third-party defense in § 1443(a)(3)(A) requires proof that the injury was caused solely by a qualifying third party and that the defendant exercised due care and took precautions against foreseeable third-party acts or omissions; contributory fault and lack of due care defeat the defense.
- Habitat Equivalency Analysis is an acceptable method to quantify compensatory restoration for interim loss of ecological services when supported by reliable scientific data.

## Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit held that the NMSA authorizes federal damages for injury to sanctuary resources on state-owned submerged lands and imposes strict liability on responsible parties, while narrowly limiting the statutory third-party defense; it vacated and remanded the primary-restoration selection because the district court relied on a mistaken understanding of expert testimony about recovery time.


United States v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 259 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2001)