## Facts

- A September 1975 airplane crash at Miami International Airport led investigators to discover a bank bag containing $15,046.
- The FBI investigated whether the flight was tied to loansharking and moving money out of the United States; the investigation focused on Charles “Bob” Ebeling and John Cifarelli, who were placed under electronic surveillance.
- In January 1976, the FBI intercepted conversations between Thomas Andrew Griffin and Ebeling about recovering the crash money, a debt Griffin owed Ebeling, and persons referenced in connection with the crash.
- On March 9, 1976, Griffin testified before a federal grand jury investigating loansharking financing and possible movement of money from the United States to South America.
- When questioned about the crash, the money, his debt, and persons named in the intercepted calls, Griffin denied knowledge or claimed he could not recall.
- Griffin was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 for corruptly endeavoring to obstruct the due administration of justice by testifying falsely before the grand jury.
- At trial, Griffin claimed his testimony was true or innocently incorrect and offered alternative explanations for the recorded conversations (including that he fabricated or that Ebeling “engineered” them).
- A jury convicted Griffin; the district court sentenced him to six months’ imprisonment and two years’ probation, and Griffin appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 1503 reaches false testimony by a witness before a federal grand jury when given with corrupt intent.
2. Whether § 1503’s history as a contempt-related provision limits it to external interference with jurors, witnesses, or court officials rather than a witness’s own false testimony.
3. Whether applying § 1503 to false grand jury testimony is unconstitutionally vague for lack of fair notice.

## Decision

- The Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction.
- The court held that perjury-like false testimony before a federal grand jury can constitute a “corrupt endeavor” to obstruct the due administration of justice under § 1503 when intended to thwart the grand jury’s investigation.
- The court concluded § 1503’s omnibus clause is broad and is not confined to interference with specific protected persons listed elsewhere in the statute.
- The court rejected the vagueness challenge, finding the statute gave fair notice that corruptly lying to impede a grand jury falls within obstruction of justice.

## Legal Principles

- The § 1503 omnibus clause criminalizes any corrupt endeavor to influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration of justice and is not limited to enumerated forms of interference.
- False testimony may be prosecuted under § 1503 when the government proves a knowing falsehood given with the purpose of hindering a grand jury or other judicial proceeding.
- The label “perjury” does not exclude prosecution under § 1503 if the conduct satisfies § 1503’s elements, including corrupt intent.
- As applied to intentional deceptive testimony aimed at frustrating a grand jury investigation, § 1503 is sufficiently definite to satisfy due process notice requirements.

## Conclusion

The Fifth Circuit upheld Griffin’s § 1503 conviction, holding that knowingly false grand jury testimony given with corrupt intent to impede the investigation can constitute obstruction of justice and that this application of § 1503 is not unconstitutionally vague.


United States v. Griffin, 589 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1979)