## Facts

- On March 14, 2012, a restaurant owner in Bayamón, Puerto Rico saw a burgundy car repeatedly pass his business and stop; two men exited, and the owner became fearful and told them to leave.
- As the men departed, the owner saw a silver handgun tucked into the waistband of the “skinny” man (not identified as Guzmán); the owner did not see Guzmán with a gun.
- The owner immediately called police and provided descriptions of the men and the burgundy Suzuki SX4, including the license plate; police broadcast the information.
- Officers later located two men matching the broadcast description near a Church’s Chicken in the Rexville Shopping Center.
- Evidence at trial indicated Guzmán entered and quickly exited the restaurant bathroom; officers detained him and found a pistol in that bathroom shortly thereafter.
- Police also found another firearm in the vehicle associated with the suspects; this firearm was not charged as the basis of the counts of conviction.
- The Church’s Chicken location was about 300 feet from the gateway to a fenced campus that included a school, but the trial record lacked evidence that Guzmán knew the area, had prior familiarity with it, or could see clear school signage from where he was detained.
- A jury convicted Guzmán of (1) being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and (2) possessing a firearm in a school zone, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A); the district court imposed 60 months on each count.

## Issues

1. Whether admitting evidence of a second, uncharged firearm was an abuse of discretion under Rules 401 and 403.
2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove Guzmán possessed the firearm found in the restaurant bathroom for purposes of § 922(g)(1).
3. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove Guzmán knew or reasonably should have known he possessed a firearm in a “school zone” under § 922(q).
4. Whether the imposed sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable.

## Decision

- The First Circuit held the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the second-firearm evidence to provide context, particularly given limiting instructions.
- The court affirmed the § 922(g)(1) conviction, concluding the circumstantial evidence permitted a rational jury to find possession of the bathroom firearm beyond a reasonable doubt.
- The court reversed the § 922(q) conviction, holding the government’s proof was insufficient on the element that Guzmán knew or reasonably should have known he was in a school zone.
- The court affirmed the sentence as to the § 922(g)(1) count, reversed the sentence tied to the § 922(q) count, and remanded for resentencing consistent with the partial reversal.

## Legal Principles

- Evidence of uncharged conduct may be admissible when relevant to provide context for the charged events, so long as its probative value is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice and limiting instructions reduce misuse.
- Possession under § 922(g)(1) may be proven through circumstantial evidence supporting an inference of knowing dominion or control; eyewitness observation of the defendant holding the firearm is not required.
- A conviction under § 922(q) requires proof that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known he was in a school zone; proximity to a school, without additional evidence supporting awareness, is insufficient.
- When an essential element is unsupported by legally sufficient evidence, reversal (rather than a new trial) is required on that count.

## Conclusion

The First Circuit allowed contextual evidence of a second firearm and upheld the felon-in-possession conviction based on circumstantial proof of possession, but it vacated the school-zone conviction because the government failed to prove Guzmán knew or should have known he was within a school zone, remanding for resentencing on the remaining count.


United States v. Guzmán-Montañez, 756 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2014)