## Facts

- Fadi B. Haddad, a Milwaukee bartender, was introduced by James Jackson (a government informant) to Charles Unger, a DEA task-force undercover officer.
- Unger and Haddad negotiated for Haddad to supply approximately one kilogram of cocaine for about $25,000–$28,000; Haddad insisted on seeing cash before arranging the purchase.
- Haddad stated he had a supplier in Chicago and indicated familiarity with arranging drug “connections,” while also claiming he could quickly sell cocaine for Unger.
- On April 13, 1991, Haddad provided vehicle titles as collateral, believing he was receiving $28,000 to buy one kilogram of cocaine for Unger; Haddad and associate Ali Charri were arrested.
- After arrest, Charri cooperated and placed a recorded call to alleged supplier John Leydon; the call discussed delays and that Chicago suppliers were angry and might cancel the deal.
- Haddad misdirected agents by identifying a Milwaukee “Tony” as the supplier rather than Leydon in Chicago.
- At trial, Haddad argued he was pressured by the informant and inexperienced in drug trafficking.

## Issues

1. Whether statements, including a recorded post-arrest call between Charri and Leydon, were admissible as co-conspirator statements under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E).
2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove Haddad attempted to possess cocaine with intent to distribute.
3. Whether the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument deprived Haddad of a fair trial.
4. Whether the district court clearly erred in denying a U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 reduction for acceptance of responsibility.

## Decision

- Affirmed the conviction and sentence.
- Held the challenged statements were properly admitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(E).
- Held the evidence was sufficient for attempt to possess with intent to distribute.
- Held the rebuttal remarks were not reversible misconduct when assessed in context.
- Held denial of the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction was not clear error.

## Legal Principles

- Co-conspirator statements are admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) if the government proves by a preponderance that (1) a conspiracy existed, (2) the declarant and defendant were members, and (3) the statement was made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
- A conspiracy does not necessarily end upon arrest of some participants; statements addressing the status, continuation, or potential cancellation of the transaction may still be “in furtherance” where other conspirators remain involved.
- Attempt to possess with intent to distribute requires intent plus a substantial step strongly corroborative of that intent; completion or actual delivery of drugs is not required.
- On sufficiency review, the verdict stands if, viewing the evidence favorably to the government, a rational jury could find the elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 is reviewed for clear error and generally requires a candid acknowledgment of criminal conduct; pursuing a trial theory that minimizes culpability may support denial.

## Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit upheld Haddad’s conviction for attempted possession with intent to distribute, finding that post-arrest statements about the drug deal’s status could qualify as co-conspirator statements in an ongoing conspiracy, that Haddad’s negotiations and provision of collateral constituted a substantial step toward the offense, and that neither the prosecutor’s rebuttal nor the denial of an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction warranted reversal.


United States v. Haddad, 976 F.2d 1088 (7th Cir. 1992)