## Facts

- A U.S. Naval Academy midshipman stole equipment from an engineering laboratory and sold it online.
- He pleaded guilty at court-martial to larceny of military property and unauthorized sale of military property under the UCMJ.
- During presentencing, he made an unsworn statement saying he sold the items to help his mother, who was requesting money and suggesting she might take her own life.
- The defense did not present duress as an affirmative defense during the guilty-plea inquiry.
- On appeal, the service court set aside the findings and sentence, reasoning the presentencing statement raised duress and required the military judge to inquire further.
- The Government appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF).

## Issues

1. Whether a military judge must reopen or further inquire into an affirmative defense (duress) after accepting a guilty plea based solely on statements made during presentencing.
2. Whether an accused’s presentencing explanation of personal pressure creates a substantial basis in law and fact to question the providence of an otherwise accepted guilty plea.
3. Whether the service court erred by setting aside the findings and sentence on the theory that the presentencing statement triggered a duty to conduct a duress inquiry.

## Decision

- CAAF reversed the service court.
- CAAF held the military judge did not err by not reopening the providence inquiry based on the presentencing unsworn statement.
- CAAF determined the presentencing statement did not clearly raise or establish a duress defense sufficient to undermine the guilty plea.
- The findings and sentence were reinstated.

## Legal Principles

- A guilty plea must be supported by a provident inquiry; if the accused raises matter inconsistent with guilt or reasonably raising an affirmative defense during the plea inquiry, the military judge must resolve it.
- After a plea is accepted as provident, later statements—particularly in presentencing—do not require reopening the plea inquiry unless they clearly raise a substantial basis in law and fact to question the plea.
- Mitigation evidence describing hardship or pressure is not the same as a legally sufficient affirmative defense; a court should not treat ambiguous sentencing remarks as automatically negating providence.
- Duress requires a legally sufficient showing (including immediacy and lack of reasonable alternatives); a generalized claim of family pressure or threatened self-harm by another, without more, is ordinarily insufficient to compel a sua sponte duress inquiry post-plea.

## Conclusion

CAAF held that a presentencing unsworn statement describing financial and emotional pressure related to a family member’s threatened self-harm did not, by itself, obligate the military judge to reopen a previously accepted guilty plea to investigate duress, and the service court erred in setting aside the convictions on that basis.


United States v. Hayes, 70 M.J. 454 (C.A.A.F. 2012)