## Facts

- A fire on April 21, 2001 severely damaged a commercial building in Taunton, Massachusetts; James Hebshie operated a convenience store in the building.
- The government charged Hebshie with arson (18 U.S.C. § 844(i)), two counts of mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341), and use of fire to commit a felony (18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(1)).
- At the 2006 trial, the prosecution relied heavily on expert-driven arson proof to show the fire was intentionally set and originated in Hebshie’s store.
- Government cause-and-origin testimony used burn patterns and a fire-spread theory that de-emphasized possible alternative origins; key scene documentation was incomplete, including limited attention to the basement.
- The government introduced accelerant-detection canine evidence: the dog alerted in a location treated as central to the asserted origin.
- The government introduced lab testimony that debris from the alert area contained a “light petroleum distillate,” a broad category common in many retail products and potentially consistent with non-accelerant sources.
- The scene was not preserved for defense inspection; the building was demolished before the defense could conduct an independent origin-and-cause investigation.
- Defense counsel did not request Daubert hearings, did not seek exclusion or limitation of the expert evidence, and declined objections even when the trial judge offered to pause proceedings for admissibility litigation.
- After convictions and a mandatory 15-year sentence (with subsequent exhaustion of direct review), Hebshie sought relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 alleging ineffective assistance focused on counsel’s handling of arson-related expert evidence.
- In § 2255 proceedings, a defense expert testified that aspects of the prosecution’s origin and fire-dynamics theory were inconsistent with accepted fire behavior and that physical features at the claimed origin were inconsistent with the government’s account.

## Issues

1. Whether trial counsel’s failure to investigate and challenge the admissibility and reliability of the government’s arson-related expert evidence, including by seeking Daubert hearings, constituted deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington.
2. Whether counsel’s failures created Strickland prejudice by creating a reasonable probability that the court would have excluded or limited key expert evidence and that the verdict would have been different.

## Decision

- The district court granted Hebshie’s § 2255 motion after an evidentiary hearing.
- The court held trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient for failing to seek Daubert review or otherwise challenge the reliability and scope of the government’s cause-and-origin, canine, and laboratory testimony.
- The court found prejudice because there was a reasonable probability that Daubert proceedings would have been granted and would have resulted in exclusion or substantial limitation of key expert proof central to establishing incendiary origin and location.
- The court vacated the convictions and ordered a new trial.

## Legal Principles

- Under Strickland, ineffective assistance requires (1) deficient performance measured against objective reasonableness and (2) prejudice shown by a reasonable probability of a different result absent counsel’s errors.
- When the prosecution’s case depends on scientific or technical expert testimony, reasonably competent defense representation includes investigating the field, consulting appropriate experts, and litigating admissibility and reliability where warranted.
- Daubert gatekeeping principles apply to proffered expert methodologies; failure to request admissibility scrutiny may be unreasonable where the evidence is central and reliability concerns are apparent.
- Prejudice may be established where the case materially turns on contested expert proof and competent challenges likely would have reduced, restricted, or excluded that proof in a way that undermines confidence in the verdict.

## Conclusion

The court vacated Hebshie’s convictions on collateral review because trial counsel failed to subject pivotal arson forensics to meaningful reliability testing through Daubert procedures or effective adversarial challenge, creating a reasonable probability that the evidentiary record—and thus the verdict—would have been different.


United States v. Hebshie, 754 F. Supp. 2d 89 (D. Mass. 2010)