## Facts

- Julian Heicklen regularly stood on a public sidewalk outside the federal courthouse at 500 Pearl Street in Manhattan, holding a “Jury Info” sign and distributing pamphlets associated with the Fully Informed Jury Association.
- The materials advocated jury nullification and stated that jurors have power to judge both law and facts according to conscience.
- The government alleged that Heicklen distributed these pamphlets immediately in front of a courthouse entrance.
- An undercover FBI agent posed as a juror, identified herself as such, and allegedly received FIJA materials and a typed handout from Heicklen.

## Issues

1. Whether an indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 1504 is legally sufficient when it alleges distribution of jury-nullification materials to jurors but does not allege a written communication tied to a specific case or issue pending before a juror.
2. Whether § 1504 reaches general public advocacy about juror power, as opposed to written communications aimed at influencing the outcome of a particular case.

## Decision

- The court granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed the single-count indictment.
- The court held the indictment was legally insufficient because it did not allege an attempt to influence a juror by written communication “in relation to” a specific “issue or matter pending before such juror.”
- The court construed § 1504 narrowly to require case-specific efforts to influence the outcome of a particular matter, not generalized pamphleteering.
- Because dismissal rested on failure to plead a statutory offense, the court did not reach the defendant’s broader claims of overbreadth, vagueness, or duplicity.

## Legal Principles

- 18 U.S.C. § 1504 requires that the alleged written communication be “in relation to” an “issue or matter pending before” the targeted juror, meaning a specific case or disputed point before that juror.
- General advocacy about jury duties or jury nullification, without linkage to a particular pending matter, does not satisfy § 1504’s case-specific element.
- When a broader reading of a criminal statute would create serious First Amendment concerns, courts may apply constitutional-avoidance principles and adopt a narrower construction consistent with statutory text.

## Conclusion

The court dismissed the § 1504 jury-tampering indictment because it failed to allege that the defendant’s written materials were directed at influencing any juror regarding a specific pending case or issue, and the statute was construed to target case-specific attempts to affect a juror’s decision rather than general advocacy about juror authority.


United States v. Heicklen, 858 F. Supp. 2d 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)