## Facts

- The defendant was prosecuted in federal court for possessing and attempting to pass a stolen public-assistance check payable to another person.
- The government’s proof of identity relied almost entirely on three eyewitnesses who saw a man attempting to cash the check and later identified the defendant as that person.
- There was little to no corroborating physical or independent evidence linking the defendant to the check beyond the eyewitness identifications.
- The defense contested identity and argued mistaken identification.
- The defendant requested a special jury instruction directing jurors on how to evaluate eyewitness identification and emphasizing acquittal if reasonable doubt existed as to identity; the trial court refused.
- The prosecution also presented testimony from a police officer recounting an eyewitness’s earlier identification statements, offered to support the in-court identification.
- The jury convicted, and the defendant appealed, challenging the refusal to give the identification instruction and the admission of the officer’s bolstering testimony.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by refusing a requested instruction specifically addressing the reliability of eyewitness identification where identity was the central issue and the government’s case lacked strong corroboration.
2. Whether admitting a police officer’s testimony repeating an eyewitness’s prior identification statements constituted improper bolstering through prior consistent statements.
3. Whether the combined effect of these rulings prejudiced the defendant and required a new trial.

## Decision

- The court of appeals reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial.
- The refusal to give a focused identification instruction was reversible error because identity was the central issue and the evidence depended almost entirely on eyewitness identifications.
- The general reasonable-doubt instruction did not adequately address the specific risk of mistaken identification in the circumstances presented.
- The admission of the officer’s testimony repeating the eyewitness’s prior identification statements was improper bolstering and added prejudice in a close case.
- The combined errors undermined confidence in the verdict, requiring retrial.

## Legal Principles

- When identity is a central issue and the prosecution’s case is not strongly corroborated, a defendant is entitled, upon request, to a specific cautionary instruction on eyewitness identification; a generic reasonable-doubt charge may be insufficient.
- Proper identification instructions should direct jurors to consider factors affecting reliability, including opportunity to observe, conditions of observation, time lapse, and inconsistencies.
- The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt both that the offense occurred and that the defendant was the person who committed it.
- Prior consistent statements are generally inadmissible to bolster a witness’s credibility; repetition of an eyewitness’s earlier identification through law-enforcement testimony is improper unless it fits a recognized, limited exception.

## Conclusion

The court ordered a new trial because the case turned on eyewitness identification without meaningful corroboration, yet the jury received no focused guidance on assessing identification reliability, and the prosecution improperly reinforced identification evidence through a police officer’s repetition of prior consistent identification statements.


United States v. Hodges, 515 F.2d 650 (7th Cir. 1975)