## Facts

- Geoffrey Honneus participated in a plan to buy marihuana in bulk in Jamaica and transport it to New England by a chartered auxiliary yacht.
- A federal indictment charged six counts: three substantive offenses and three conspiracy counts corresponding to the same objectives.
- The substantive counts alleged: (1) importation of marihuana (21 U.S.C. § 952(a)); (2) possession with intent to distribute and distribution (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)); and (3) smuggling (18 U.S.C. § 545).
- The conspiracy counts were brought under three different conspiracy statutes: conspiracy to import (21 U.S.C. § 963), conspiracy to distribute/possess with intent (21 U.S.C. § 846), and general conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 371).
- Each conspiracy count alleged identical overt acts, and Honneus argued the evidence showed only one overarching agreement.
- Honneus also argued the government failed to prove the substance was “marihuana” because the statutory definition referred to “Cannabis sativa L.” and, according to proposed expert testimony, cannabis could include multiple species.
- The district court excluded the expert testimony aimed at narrowing the statutory meaning and treated “Cannabis sativa L.” as covering all marihuana-producing cannabis.
- A jury convicted Honneus; he received convictions and sentences on multiple counts and appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether a single agreement with identical overt acts can support separate conspiracy convictions and sentences when each count is charged under a different federal conspiracy statute.
2. Whether “Cannabis sativa L.” in the federal definition of marihuana requires the government to prove the specific botanical species of the cannabis involved, and whether excluding expert testimony on species distinctions was error.

## Decision

- The First Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences.
- It held that separate conspiracy convictions and sentences were permissible because each conspiracy count was charged under a different conspiracy statute with differences in elements and penalty structure.
- It held that “Cannabis sativa L.” was intended by Congress as a broad term covering all marihuana-producing cannabis, so the government was not required to prove a specific scientific species.
- The court upheld exclusion of expert testimony offered to narrow the statutory definition based on later botanical classifications.

## Legal Principles

- Braverman’s single-agreement rule limits multiple punishments when multiple conspiracy counts are brought under the same conspiracy statute; it does not necessarily bar multiple conspiracy convictions when Congress has created distinct conspiracy statutes tied to different regulatory schemes or substantive offenses.
- When interpreting statutory terms with scientific wording, courts may use Congress’s understanding at the time of enactment rather than later scientific reclassification, particularly where a narrow reading would defeat the statute’s evident coverage.
- For federal marihuana offenses, “Cannabis sativa L.” is construed to include all cannabis that produces the hallucinogenic material commonly known as marihuana, without requiring proof of a particular botanical species.

## Conclusion

The court sustained multiple conspiracy convictions arising from one agreement because the conspiracies were charged under separate statutes, and it construed “Cannabis sativa L.” as a generic statutory label for all marihuana-producing cannabis, making species-specific proof unnecessary and supporting exclusion of expert testimony offered to narrow the definition.


United States v. Honneus, 508 F.2d 566 (1st Cir. 1974)