## Facts

- Donald Leonard Houser, a non-Indian, shot and killed Angela Rae LaSarte, an Indian, within the Coeur d'Alene Indian Reservation in Idaho.
- Houser and LaSarte had dated intermittently for about two years; evidence showed Houser was frequently violent toward her, often after heavy drinking.
- On the night of the killing, Houser drank for several hours at a bar and was involved in altercations outside.
- Houser retrieved a handgun from his truck, chambered a round, held the gun behind his back, and walked toward the bar.
- LaSarte approached Houser; they met briefly in the street without speaking or struggling, and Houser shot her at close range.
- Houser testified the gun was drawn to ward off spectators, that he did not know it was loaded or that the safety was off, and that it discharged accidentally during a purported struggle.
- Houser was charged with second-degree murder, 18 U.S.C. § 1111, and using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
- A jury convicted Houser on both counts, and he appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether due process was violated by an instruction permitting a permissive inference of malice aforethought from the intentional use of a deadly weapon.
2. Whether an instruction allowing second-degree murder based on killing “recklessly with extreme disregard for human life” misstated § 1111 malice aforethought.
3. Whether § 1111 second-degree murder requires a separate jury finding of “willfulness” beyond malice aforethought, making the omission of a willfulness instruction error.
4. Whether Congress has authority under the Indian Commerce Clause to apply federal homicide law to a non-Indian who kills an Indian in Indian country.

## Decision

- The Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions.
- The deadly-weapon instruction created a permissive inference, not a mandatory presumption, and did not shift the government’s burden of proof.
- “Extreme disregard for human life” correctly stated a form of malice aforethought sufficient for § 1111 second-degree murder, even when directed at a single victim.
- No separate “willfulness” instruction was required because malice aforethought (intentional killing or extreme-recklessness killing) supplied the needed mental state.
- Congress validly exercised Indian Commerce Clause power to criminalize violent offenses by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country.

## Legal Principles

- A permissive inference instruction satisfies due process if it leaves the ultimate finding to the jury, does not shift the burden of proof, and the inferred fact bears a rational connection to the proved fact.
- Under 18 U.S.C. § 1111, malice aforethought for second-degree murder may be shown by an intentional killing or by reckless killing with extreme disregard (extreme indifference) for human life.
- “Depraved heart” malice under § 1111 does not require endangerment of the public at large; extreme disregard toward a single victim can suffice.
- Section 1111 does not require a separate “willfulness” element apart from malice aforethought as properly defined in the instructions.
- Congress may regulate and punish certain crimes in Indian country, including violent crimes by non-Indians against Indians, pursuant to its Indian Commerce Clause authority.

## Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit upheld Houser’s federal second-degree murder and § 924(c) convictions, concluding that the challenged malice instructions correctly stated the law and preserved the government’s burden of proof, and that Congress constitutionally applied federal criminal law to a non-Indian’s killing of an Indian on a reservation.


United States v. Houser, 130 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 1997)