## Facts

- Alphonso O. Houser, a servicemember, was tried by general court-martial for raping a 15-year-old girl who viewed him as an “uncle.”
- The complainant alleged nonconsensual intercourse after spending time at Houser’s quarters; Houser denied that a rape occurred.
- The defense emphasized the complainant’s limited physical resistance, failure to cry out, and delay in reporting until the next morning to challenge credibility and consent.
- A physician examined the complainant after the report and concluded her injuries were consistent with rape.
- The prosecution offered a psychologist, Dr. Pamela Remer, as an expert to describe rape-trauma syndrome (RTS) as a framework for common post-rape symptoms and to explain why some victims delay reporting.
- Dr. Remer had not examined or interviewed the complainant and did not present her testimony as a case-specific diagnosis that the complainant had RTS.
- Houser objected that the RTS testimony, without an individual examination, would improperly bolster the complainant’s credibility and prejudice the panel; the military judge admitted the testimony.
- The panel convicted Houser of rape and sentenced him to a dishonorable discharge and 30 years’ confinement.
- The Army Court of Military Review affirmed; Houser appealed to the United States Court of Military Appeals.

## Issues

1. Whether the military judge abused discretion by admitting RTS expert testimony from a psychologist who did not examine the complainant, offered to explain delayed reporting and related behavior.
2. What foundational requirements govern admissibility of expert testimony in courts-martial under Mil. R. Evid. 702–703 and the Mil. R. Evid. 403 balancing test.

## Decision

- The court affirmed the conviction and sentence.
- The court held the military judge did not abuse discretion in admitting RTS testimony as general explanatory evidence about common victim behavior in response to the defense theory.
- The court articulated six foundational factors (the “Houser factors”) for admitting expert testimony in courts-martial.
- The court concluded the testimony’s probative value in assisting the factfinder outweighed the risk of unfair prejudice when confined to general behavioral patterns and not used to opine that a rape occurred or that the complainant was truthful.

## Legal Principles

- Expert testimony in courts-martial must satisfy six conditions: (1) the expert is qualified; (2) the subject matter is appropriate for expert assistance; (3) the testimony has an adequate basis under Mil. R. Evid. 703; (4) the evidence is legally relevant; (5) the evidence is reliable; and (6) its probative value is not substantially outweighed by dangers identified in Mil. R. Evid. 403.
- “Syndrome” evidence may be admitted to assist factfinders in understanding behavior that may appear inconsistent with an allegation (e.g., delayed reporting or limited resistance), particularly where the defense makes such behavior a central theme.
- An expert may describe general characteristics or patterns but may not provide a direct opinion that the charged offense occurred or that the complainant is truthful; such opinions impermissibly intrude on the factfinder’s role and increase unfair prejudice.
- Trial judges have a gatekeeping duty to ensure expert evidence rests on information reasonably relied upon in the field and is presented within limits that prevent substitution of expert authority for the panel’s determination of disputed facts.

## Conclusion

The court upheld admission of general RTS testimony to explain post-assault behavior where the defense attacked the complainant’s delayed report and limited resistance, and it formalized a six-factor framework for admitting expert testimony in courts-martial focused on qualification, fit, basis, relevance, reliability, and Mil. R. Evid. 403 balancing.


United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993)