## Facts

- Webster L. Hubbell, a former Associate Attorney General, had entered a plea agreement in an earlier investigation-related prosecution and was later subpoenaed while serving his sentence.
- A grand jury subpoena duces tecum required Hubbell to produce documents falling within 11 broadly worded categories concerning his finances and related records.
- Hubbell appeared before the grand jury, invoked the Fifth Amendment, and refused to state whether he possessed responsive documents.
- The government obtained an order under 18 U.S.C. § 6003 compelling compliance and granting immunity “to the extent allowed by law.”
- Hubbell produced 13,120 pages of documents and testified that the production represented all documents in his control responsive to the subpoena.
- The government used the produced documents and their contents to investigate further and secured an indictment charging Hubbell with tax offenses and mail and wire fraud.

## Issues

1. Whether the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination protects a witness from being compelled to identify and produce potentially incriminating documents when the government cannot describe the sought documents with reasonable particularity.
2. Whether, after a grant of immunity under 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002–6003, the government may use the produced documents or investigative leads derived from the act of production to prepare and bring criminal charges against the producing witness.
3. What showing the government must make to establish that evidence used to prosecute is derived from sources wholly independent of the testimonial aspects of an immunized act of production.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the indictment in an 8–1 decision authored by Justice Stevens.
- The Court held that, in these circumstances, compelled production had testimonial aspects because it communicated the existence, possession or control, and authenticity or responsiveness of the documents.
- The subpoena’s breadth required Hubbell to exercise judgment to identify, locate, and assemble responsive materials, making the production a compelled disclosure of the contents of his mind.
- Because Hubbell produced the documents under a statutory immunity order, 18 U.S.C. § 6002 barred the government from using the testimonial aspects of production and any information directly or indirectly derived from them.
- The government failed to show that the evidence used to indict Hubbell came from legitimate sources wholly independent of the compelled, immunized act of production.

## Legal Principles

- The Fifth Amendment does not generally protect the contents of voluntarily created documents, but the act of producing documents in response to a subpoena may be testimonial when it implicitly conveys existence, possession or control, and authenticity or responsiveness.
- When the government compels compliance after invocation of the Fifth Amendment under 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002–6003, the immunity provided is use and derivative-use immunity covering the testimonial aspects of the act of production.
- The government may not use compelled, immunized testimony—or information derived directly or indirectly from it—in a criminal case against the witness, absent proof that the evidence is derived from sources wholly independent of the immunized act.
- If the government can describe sought documents with reasonable particularity based on prior knowledge, compelled production may add little testimonial value; broad subpoenas seeking unknown materials can make production substantially testimonial and incriminating.
- A prosecution is barred where the government builds charges by exploiting documents and leads obtained through an immunized act of production, rather than through independent investigative sources.

## Conclusion

The Court required dismissal because the government used a broad subpoena and an immunity order to compel a testimonial act of production and then derived the indictment from what that compelled production revealed, contrary to the Fifth Amendment and § 6002’s bar on use and derivative use.


United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000)