## Facts

- On February 12, 1996, a fire severely damaged the Morning Star School in Lame Deer, Montana, on the Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation; no one was injured.
- R.S.W., a 12-year-old seventh-grade student and Native American juvenile, was proceeded against in federal court under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act for arson occurring in Indian country.
- The government charged arson under 18 U.S.C. § 81, with federal jurisdiction tied to Indian country (18 U.S.C. § 1153) and juvenile proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 5032.
- Shortly before the fire, R.S.W. and a friend went into the girls’ restroom, which contained automatic paper-towel dispensers mounted on a privacy partition.
- R.S.W. testified she was “playing” with a lighter:
  - She lit the corner of a paper towel from a dispenser, let it burn briefly, blew it out, and put the burned towel in the sink.
  - She then lit the left corner of another towel protruding from the dispenser, blew it out, then lit the right corner of the same towel, blew it out, and left the restroom.
- The school later caught fire; the building was evacuated.
- Investigators determined the fire originated in the girls’ restroom.
- After a bench trial, the district court adjudicated R.S.W. a juvenile delinquent. The court reasoned that because R.S.W. knew an unattended indoor fire could burn a building, she “intended to set fire to or burn” the school.
- The court imposed a disposition including five years of probation.
- R.S.W. appealed, arguing the evidence was insufficient because the government failed to prove the mental state required by § 81.

## Issues

1. What mental state does “maliciously” require under the federal arson statute, 18 U.S.C. § 81?
2. Under the correct definition of “maliciously,” was the evidence sufficient to support the juvenile delinquency adjudication for arson?

## Decision

- The Ninth Circuit affirmed the adjudication of juvenile delinquency and the probationary disposition.
- The court held that § 81 does not require proof that the defendant specifically intended to burn the entire building or knew that building damage was the “likely result.”
- The court interpreted “maliciously” in § 81 to mean that the defendant either intentionally set a fire or acted with willful or reckless disregard of the likelihood that the act would cause a fire that could damage property.
- Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the court concluded a rational factfinder could find beyond a reasonable doubt that R.S.W. acted “maliciously” under § 81 based on her repeated ignition of paper towels inside the school and then leaving the area.
- The court affirmed on a ground different from the district court’s apparent focus on intent (or knowledge) to burn the building as such.

## Legal Principles

- Under 18 U.S.C. § 81, “maliciously” does not require a specific intent to destroy a particular building or to cause the full extent of the eventual damage.
- “Maliciously” is satisfied by intentional ignition, or by acting with willful or reckless disregard of the likelihood that one’s conduct will cause a fire that can damage property.
- On review for sufficiency of the evidence, the appellate court asks whether, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
- In a juvenile delinquency adjudication based on a federal offense, the government still must prove each element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt, including the required mental state.

## Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit upheld R.S.W.’s juvenile delinquency adjudication for arson arising from a school restroom fire, ruling that “maliciously” under 18 U.S.C. § 81 is met by intentionally setting a fire (or acting with reckless disregard of the likelihood of fire-related damage) and does not require proof that the defendant intended to burn the entire school building.


United States v. Jane Doe (R.S.W.), 136 F.3d 631 (1998)