## Facts

- Charles Demore Jewell agreed, for $100, to drive a car from northern Mexico into the United States after being approached by a stranger near the border.
- At the border, customs officials discovered approximately 110 pounds of marijuana concealed in a secret compartment between the trunk and rear seat.
- Jewell admitted he knew the car contained a secret compartment but did not inspect it.
- Jewell claimed he did not actually know marijuana was in the vehicle, but evidence supported that he suspected contraband and avoided confirming it.
- The government argued Jewell deliberately avoided acquiring positive knowledge and that this deliberate ignorance met the statutory “knowingly” requirement.

## Issues

1. Whether “knowingly” under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 960 requires proof of actual knowledge of contraband, or is satisfied by awareness of a high probability of the fact combined with deliberate avoidance of confirmation.
2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by instructing the jury that knowledge could be found if the defendant’s ignorance resulted from a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth.

## Decision

- The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the convictions.
- The court held that deliberate ignorance and positive knowledge are equally culpable for purposes of the statutes’ “knowingly” element.
- The court approved the challenged instruction, permitting a finding of knowledge if any lack of actual awareness was solely due to a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth, provided the jury found this beyond a reasonable doubt.
- The court also rejected prior characterizations treating § 841(a)(1) as a mere “general intent” offense, clarifying that the statutes require knowledge of dealing with a controlled substance and, for distribution counts, intent to distribute (without requiring knowledge of the specific drug).

## Legal Principles

- “Knowledge” may be proved by showing the defendant was aware of a high probability that a fact existed and deliberately avoided learning the truth, unless the defendant actually believed the fact did not exist.
- A willful-blindness instruction is permissible when the evidence supports an inference that the defendant intentionally avoided confirming a strongly suspected fact.
- For federal drug offenses requiring that the defendant act “knowingly,” the government need not prove knowledge of the specific controlled substance, but must prove knowledge of the presence and illicit nature of a controlled substance (and intent to distribute where charged).

## Conclusion

The court upheld the use of a willful-blindness instruction and affirmed Jewell’s drug convictions, holding that a defendant who consciously avoids confirming a highly probable fact may be treated as acting “knowingly” under federal drug statutes.


United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc)