Facts
- Jorn, an income-tax preparer, was charged in federal district court with willfully assisting in preparing fraudulent income tax returns.
- A jury was impaneled and sworn, and the Government called a taxpayer witness who had been warned of constitutional rights and said he was willing to testify.
- The trial judge concluded the warnings were probably inadequate, refused to allow testimony until the witness consulted counsel, and then discharged the jury on the judge’s own motion so witnesses could consult attorneys.
- Jorn did not request a mistrial and did not consent to terminating the trial.
- Before a second jury was sworn for retrial, Jorn moved to dismiss the information on former jeopardy grounds; the district court dismissed.
- The United States appealed the dismissal directly to the Supreme Court.
Issues
- Whether the Government may appeal a district court order sustaining a pretrial motion in bar based on former jeopardy when entered before a second jury is impaneled.
- Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars reprosecution after a judge declares a mistrial sua sponte, without the defendant’s request or consent, absent “manifest necessity.”
Decision
- The Court held the Government could appeal the dismissal because it was entered before the second jury was impaneled.
- The Court affirmed the dismissal on double jeopardy grounds.
- The Court concluded the mistrial was not supported by “manifest necessity” and that the trial judge abused discretion by terminating the first trial abruptly and without adequate consideration of alternatives.
- Because jeopardy had attached when the first jury was sworn, and the defendant neither sought nor consented to the mistrial, retrial was barred.
Legal Principles
- Jeopardy attaches in a jury trial when the jury is impaneled and sworn.
- When a mistrial is declared over the defendant’s objection or without the defendant’s consent, retrial is permitted only if termination was compelled by “manifest necessity.”
- “Manifest necessity” requires a scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion; a trial judge should not foreclose the defendant’s choice to proceed with the first jury without considering reasonable, less drastic alternatives.
- The Double Jeopardy Clause protects a defendant’s interest in having the trial completed by the initially selected tribunal and limits unnecessary exposure to repeated prosecutions.
Conclusion
The Court allowed the Government’s appeal but held that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred retrial because the judge sua sponte discharged the sworn jury without manifest necessity and without the defendant’s request or consent.