## Facts

- Federal prosecutors charged Carolyn Kravetz and Boris Levitin with participating in a scheme to defraud Dunkin’ Brands, Inc.
- Both defendants pleaded guilty in federal court.
- At sentencing, the defendants submitted sentencing memoranda and third-party letters supporting leniency.
- The district court imposed probationary sentences despite the government’s request for substantial prison time.
- A journalist, Jim Edwards, sought to unseal (1) the sentencing memoranda and support letters and (2) Levitin’s sealed Rule 17(c) subpoena application materials.
- Kravetz opposed unsealing, asserting the filings contained deeply personal information about herself and third parties.
- The district court denied the motion to unseal both categories of documents without providing detailed, document-specific findings.

## Issues

1. Whether the common-law right of access applies to defendants’ sentencing memoranda and third-party sentencing letters filed for the court’s consideration at sentencing.
2. Whether the common-law right of access applies to sealed pretrial Rule 17(c) subpoena application materials.
3. Whether the district court was required to make specific on-the-record findings and consider redaction or partial unsealing before keeping materials sealed.
4. Whether the First Amendment independently compels access to the documents sought.

## Decision

- The First Circuit held that defendants’ sentencing memoranda and third-party sentencing letters are judicial records subject to a common-law presumption of public access.
- The court vacated the denial of access as to the sentencing memoranda and letters and remanded for the district court to conduct a document-specific balancing analysis and consider redaction.
- The court affirmed the denial of access as to the Rule 17(c) subpoena materials, concluding they are discovery-like materials not subject to the same presumption of public access.
- The court declined to recognize a freestanding First Amendment right that would categorically require disclosure of all materials at issue.

## Legal Principles

- The common-law right of access applies to “judicial records,” generally defined as materials relevant to, and relied on in, adjudicating substantive rights.
- Sentencing memoranda and third-party sentencing letters submitted for the court’s consideration at sentencing qualify as judicial records and presumptively should be open to the public.
- The presumption of access is qualified and may be overcome by countervailing interests, including privacy interests, especially those of third parties.
- When restricting access to judicial records, a district court must provide specific, on-the-record reasons sufficient to permit meaningful review.
- Restrictions on access must be narrowly tailored; courts should consider redaction or partial unsealing before wholesale sealing.
- Rule 17(c) subpoena application materials are treated as discovery-like tools for obtaining evidence and do not carry the same common-law presumption of public access.

## Conclusion

The First Circuit required renewed consideration of public access to sentencing memoranda and support letters under a common-law presumption of openness, with specific findings and potential redactions, while upholding continued sealing of Rule 17(c) subpoena application materials because they are not subject to the same access presumption.


United States v. Kravetz, 706 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2013)