Facts
- David Lanier served as a state chancery court judge in rural Tennessee.
- From 1989 to 1991, Lanier sexually assaulted multiple women in or connected to his judicial chambers, including court employees and women appearing in matters subject to his authority.
- The indictment charged 11 counts under 18 U.S.C. § 242, alleging Lanier, acting willfully and under color of state law, deprived the victims of Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests, including a right to be free from willful sexual assault.
- A federal jury convicted Lanier on multiple § 242 counts, and the district court imposed a prison sentence.
- The Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, set aside the convictions, reasoning that due process “fair warning” was absent because there was no prior Supreme Court decision applying the asserted constitutional right in a “fundamentally similar” factual setting.
Issues
- What due process “fair warning” standard governs criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. § 242 for deprivations of constitutional rights under color of law.
- Whether due process requires (a) a prior Supreme Court decision identifying the specific constitutional right and (b) application of that right in a “fundamentally similar” factual situation before a § 242 conviction may stand.
Decision
- The Supreme Court held that the Sixth Circuit applied an incorrect and overly demanding fair-warning standard.
- Due process is satisfied if, at the time of the conduct, the statute—standing alone or as construed by courts—made it reasonably clear that the conduct was criminal.
- The Court rejected any requirement that fair warning depends on a prior Supreme Court case with “fundamentally similar” facts.
- The Court vacated the Sixth Circuit’s judgment and remanded for application of the correct standard.
Legal Principles
- 18 U.S.C. § 242 incorporates constitutional law by reference; its application depends on whether the incorporated constitutional right was sufficiently definite to give notice in the circumstances.
- Due process requires “fair warning” before criminal liability may be imposed: the law must make the prohibited nature of the conduct reasonably understandable at the time of the act.
- Fair warning may be supplied by judicial constructions (“judicial gloss”) interpreting the relevant constitutional right; it is not limited to Supreme Court decisions.
- Factually identical precedent is unnecessary when an established general constitutional rule applies with “obvious clarity” to the conduct at issue.
- The rule of lenity resolves genuine statutory ambiguity in favor of defendants, but it does not impose a rigid demand for near-identical precedent where unlawfulness would have been apparent in light of existing law.
Conclusion
The Court clarified that § 242 prosecutions satisfy due process when existing law made it reasonably clear that the charged conduct was criminal, and it rejected a heightened requirement of fact-matched Supreme Court precedent, remanding for reconsideration under the proper fair-warning standard.