## Facts

- Leo LeCompte was charged with abusive sexual contact with his wife’s 11-year-old niece, C.D., in January 1995, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2244(a)(1) and 2246(3).
- C.D. alleged that LeCompte had previously played games with her and exposed himself, and that during the charged incident he joined her on a couch, forced her to touch his penis, and touched her breasts.
- The government sought to introduce testimony from another niece by marriage, T.T., describing uncharged sexual abuse by LeCompte between 1985 and 1987, including playing games, exposure, forcing her to touch his penis, and touching her intimate areas.
- In a prior trial, the district court admitted T.T.’s testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b); the jury convicted LeCompte; and the Eighth Circuit reversed, finding Rule 404(b) admission improper.
- On remand, after providing the notice required for Rule 414, the government again offered T.T.’s testimony as evidence of similar crimes in a child-molestation case under Federal Rule of Evidence 414.
- The district court concluded the testimony was potentially admissible under Rule 414 but excluded it under Rule 403 as substantially more unfairly prejudicial than probative.
- The United States took an interlocutory appeal from the pretrial exclusion order under 18 U.S.C. § 3731.

## Issues

1. Whether the district court abused its discretion under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 by excluding prior child-molestation evidence offered under Federal Rule of Evidence 414.
2. How Rule 403’s unfair-prejudice balancing must be applied in light of Congress’s purpose in enacting Rule 414 to broaden admissibility of similar child-molestation acts.

## Decision

- The Eighth Circuit reversed the order granting the motion in limine excluding T.T.’s testimony.
- The court held that the district court misapplied Rule 403 by excluding evidence that Rule 414 was intended to make generally admissible.
- The court concluded T.T.’s testimony had strong probative value due to close similarity between the prior alleged acts and the charged conduct, the victims’ relationship to LeCompte, and comparable settings.
- The court determined that the risk of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value, and that routine exclusion on prejudice grounds would defeat Rule 414’s function.
- The case was remanded for further proceedings with the Rule 414 evidence to be admitted subject to ordinary trial controls (including limiting instructions and management of cumulativeness).

## Legal Principles

- Federal Rule of Evidence 414 permits admission, in a child-molestation prosecution, of evidence that the defendant committed other child-molestation offenses, as a legislative departure from prior restrictive approaches to propensity evidence.
- Rule 403 continues to apply to Rule 414 evidence, but its balancing must account for Congress’s decision to substantially relax prior limits on admitting similar child-molestation acts.
- High similarity between the charged conduct and prior acts, including comparable victim relationships and methods, substantially increases probative value and supports admission under Rule 414.
- “Unfair prejudice” under Rule 403 is not established merely because evidence is damaging; the focus is whether the evidence invites conviction on an improper basis rather than its legitimate relevance.

## Conclusion

The Eighth Circuit held that, in light of Rule 414’s purpose, the district court erred in excluding highly similar prior child-molestation testimony under Rule 403, and it reversed the in limine exclusion to allow the evidence at retrial.


United States v. LeCompte, 131 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 1997)