## Facts

- During the Civil War, Congress imposed a direct tax on land in designated “insurrectionary districts,” including property later known as the Arlington estate in Virginia.
- Taxes of $92.07 were assessed on the Arlington estate in 1864, which was held by Mary Anna Custis Lee, with a remainder interest later vesting in her son, George Washington Custis Lee.
- The Lee family arranged to pay the tax, but federal tax commissioners refused payment unless the owner appeared in person.
- When Mary Anna Lee did not appear personally, the commissioners declared the property delinquent, conducted a tax sale, and purchased the land for the United States.
- Federal officials used and controlled the property for public purposes, including as a national cemetery.
- After Mary Anna Lee died, George Washington Custis Lee sought compensation from Congress but received no relief.
- Lee filed an ejectment action in Virginia state court against the federal military officers occupying the land to recover possession.
- The United States intervened and removed the case to federal circuit court; the Attorney General moved to dismiss on the ground that the suit was effectively against the United States and barred by sovereign immunity.
- The circuit court denied dismissal; a jury found the tax sale unlawful and returned a verdict for Lee, and judgment was entered restoring Lee’s right to possession.
- The United States and the individual officers sought Supreme Court review.

## Issues

1. Whether sovereign immunity bars an action against federal officers in possession of land for the United States when the plaintiff alleges the officers are unlawfully withholding the plaintiff’s property.
2. Whether a federal tax sale is valid when tax commissioners refuse timely payment unless made personally by the owner, a condition not required by statute.

## Decision

- The Court affirmed the judgment for Lee.
- Sovereign immunity was reaffirmed as a general rule barring suits against the United States without consent, but it did not bar an action against officers alleged to be acting unlawfully in depriving a claimant of property.
- Courts may inquire into the lawfulness of officers’ possession and the claimed federal title when officers are sued for possession of property allegedly held without lawful authority.
- The tax sale was void because the commissioners lacked authority to require personal payment by the owner and thus unlawfully prevented payment.
- Because the purported sale conveyed no valid title, the officers’ continued possession could be treated as unlawful as against the rightful owner.

## Legal Principles

- Federal sovereign immunity generally precludes suits against the United States absent congressional consent, but it does not automatically shield federal officers from suit when they are alleged to act beyond statutory or constitutional authority in holding property.
- A plaintiff may sue federal officers to recover possession of property and to test the legality of their asserted authority, even if the United States claims an interest in the property.
- Constitutional protections for property (including due process and limits on uncompensated takings) support judicial review when government actors allegedly deprive an owner of property without lawful process.
- Administrative conditions added by officials to statutory tax-payment requirements are invalid; when officials refuse lawful payment based on an unauthorized condition, a resulting tax sale may be void.
- When officials make payment impossible through an unauthorized rule, the law does not require futile acts (such as a tender that would be refused) as a precondition to challenging the sale.

## Conclusion

The Court held that sovereign immunity did not bar an ejectment action against federal officers alleged to be unlawfully holding private property for public use, and it ruled that the Arlington estate tax sale was void because officials imposed an unauthorized “owner in person” payment requirement that unlawfully prevented timely payment.


United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882)