## Facts

- Joshua A. Levine was indicted in the Western District of Texas for armed bank robbery and a related firearm offense (18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a), 2113(d), and 924(c)).
- On August 17, 1993, Levine robbed an Austin, Texas bank at gunpoint, timing the robbery for a period just before the bank’s security guard typically arrived.
- Levine wore a mask and gloves, carried a 9mm pistol and a money bag, entered the bank, and ordered tellers to turn over money.
- Two tellers included two packets of “bait money,” each containing an electronic transmitter used in a bank–police tracking program.
- As Levine left the bank, he spilled much of the money from his bag, including one of the bait-money packets; the second packet remained with him.
- About forty minutes later, an Austin police officer monitoring the tracking system detected the transmitter signal moving north on Interstate 35 and followed it, ruling out other vehicles until Levine’s car was the only remaining source of the signal.
- After Levine parked, the officer approached with his weapon drawn, ordered Levine to stop, and directed him to place his hands on the car; when Levine moved a hand toward his pocket, the officer frisked and handcuffed him.
- Another officer arrived, moved Levine to a patrol car, and administered Miranda warnings.
- The first officer used a handheld detector around Levine’s car and received a strong signal toward the rear; after looking in the back seat without finding the source, the officer used Levine’s keys to open the trunk and recovered the money bag, a bait-money packet, and other evidence.
- Before trial, Levine sought suppression of the physical evidence from the stop and car search, arguing the arrest and warrantless trunk search were unlawful; the district court denied the motion.
- At trial, Levine raised an insanity defense, presenting a witness who testified that Levine suffered from bipolar disorder.
- The government called its own mental-health witness, who testified that Levine was not suffering from bipolar disorder to the extent required for the insanity defense at the time of the robbery.
- On redirect, the prosecutor posed a hypothetical closely matching the robbery facts and asked whether the described conduct was consistent with a person diagnosed with bipolar disorder experiencing a severe manic episode; the district court overruled Levine’s objection.
- Levine also argued that the prosecutor misstated the insanity standard during closing argument and that the district court did not immediately correct the statement; the jury received instructions stating the governing law.
- The jury found Levine guilty, and he appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the Fourth Amendment required suppression because Levine was allegedly arrested without probable cause and his car (including the trunk) was searched without a warrant.
2. Whether the government’s mental-health testimony, given in response to a case-specific hypothetical, violated Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) by improperly addressing the ultimate issue on the insanity defense.
3. Whether alleged misstatements about the insanity standard in the prosecutor’s closing argument required reversal, including whether the district court erred by not immediately correcting them.

## Decision

- The Fifth Circuit affirmed Levine’s conviction.
- The court held that the transmitter tracking and related circumstances gave officers probable cause to arrest Levine and probable cause to believe evidence of the robbery would be found in his car.
- The court held that the warrantless vehicle search, including the trunk, was lawful under the automobile exception once probable cause existed.
- The court held that the government witness’s answer to the hypothetical did not violate Rule 704(b) because it addressed whether conduct was consistent with a claimed diagnosis and episode, not whether Levine satisfied the legal test for insanity.
- The court held that any arguable misstatement in closing argument did not warrant reversal in light of the full context and the district court’s correct jury instructions on the insanity defense.

## Legal Principles

- Information from electronic tracking of stolen bait money, combined with the timing and location of the signal and other confirming facts, can establish probable cause to arrest a suspect and to search a vehicle for evidence of the robbery.
- Under the automobile exception, when officers have probable cause to believe a vehicle contains contraband or evidence, they may search the vehicle without a warrant, including areas such as the trunk where the object of the search could be concealed.
- Officers may use heightened safety measures (including drawing a weapon, frisking, and handcuffing) when confronting a suspected armed robber, and those measures do not by themselves make the seizure unlawful when probable cause exists.
- Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) prohibits an expert from stating an opinion on whether a defendant did or did not have the mental state constituting an element of the crime or defense, but it permits mental-health testimony describing diagnoses, symptoms, and whether observed conduct is medically consistent or inconsistent with a claimed disorder, so long as the witness does not give a direct legal conclusion on insanity.
- Proper jury instructions on the governing legal standard generally cure isolated or arguable misstatements of law made during closing argument unless the comments, considered in context, rendered the trial unfair.

## Conclusion

United States v. Levine, 80 F.3d 129 (5th Cir. 1996), affirmed Levine’s armed bank-robbery conviction, holding that transmitter-based tracking supplied probable cause for his arrest and for a warrantless vehicle search extending to the trunk, that the government’s mental-health testimony responding to a near-identical hypothetical did not violate Rule 704(b) because it stayed on medical consistency rather than a legal insanity conclusion, and that the district court’s correct insanity instructions prevented any claimed closing-argument misstatement from requiring reversal.


United States v. Levine, 80 F.3d 129 (1996)