## Facts

- In November 1975, several defendants were arrested and indicted on firearms and dynamite-related charges.
- In March 1976, the district court suppressed evidence on the dynamite counts; the Government noticed an interlocutory appeal and sought a continuance.
- The district court denied a continuance and dismissed the indictment when the Government was not ready for trial.
- In August 1979, the Ninth Circuit reversed the suppression order and held the district court erred in dismissing the remaining counts; the mandate issued in March 1980 after an extended appellate period, during which defendants were unconditionally released.
- On remand, the district court directed reindictment on firearms charges; in August 1980 it dismissed one defendant for vindictive prosecution and denied dismissal for others, prompting further appeals while defendants remained free on their own recognizance.
- In July 1982, the Ninth Circuit reversed the vindictive-prosecution dismissal and dismissed the other defendants’ appeals; the mandate issued in January 1983.
- In May 1983, the district court dismissed the indictment on Sixth Amendment speedy trial grounds; the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
- The Supreme Court granted review and reversed, holding the Speedy Trial Clause was not violated.

## Issues

1. Whether time during which the indictment was dismissed and defendants were free of restraints counts toward Sixth Amendment speedy-trial delay.
2. How pretrial appellate delays, including the Government’s interlocutory appeals and defendants’ litigation activity, should be weighed under the Barker v. Wingo factors.
3. Whether the overall delay, considering assertion of the right and prejudice, required dismissal of the indictment under the Sixth Amendment.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right was not violated.
- The Court excluded from the constitutional calculation periods when no indictment was pending and defendants were not subject to actual restraints on liberty.
- The Court treated the Government’s interlocutory appeals, undertaken in good faith and not frivolously, as a valid reason that justified delay.
- The Court found defendants’ repeated filings and unsuccessful motions reduced the weight of their speedy-trial assertions.
- The Court concluded defendants failed to show sufficient prejudice to justify the severe remedy of dismissal.

## Legal Principles

- The Speedy Trial Clause is engaged by an outstanding charge and actual restraints associated with being held to answer; time when the indictment is dismissed and the accused is free of restrictions is excluded from Sixth Amendment delay analysis.
- Speedy-trial claims are evaluated under Barker v. Wingo’s four factors: length of delay, reason for delay, defendant’s assertion of the right, and prejudice.
- Government interlocutory appeals, particularly from suppression orders, ordinarily constitute a valid reason for delay when pursued without bad faith or frivolousness.
- A defendant’s litigation conduct is relevant: repetitive or frivolous motions and petitions can diminish the weight accorded to asserted speedy-trial demands.
- Dismissal for a constitutional speedy-trial violation requires a concrete showing of prejudice; mere possibility of prejudice is insufficient, especially where incarceration or substantial liberty restraints are absent.

## Conclusion

The Court held that extended delays largely attributable to good-faith appellate review and defense-initiated litigation did not violate the Sixth Amendment, and that periods with no pending indictment and no liberty restraints could not be counted toward a speedy-trial violation warranting dismissal.


United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302 (1986)