## Facts

- Eugene Lovasco was investigated for possessing firearms stolen from the U.S. mail and dealing in firearms without a federal license.
- The alleged offenses occurred between July 25 and August 31, 1973.
- The government prepared an investigative report about a month after the crimes, and relatively little additional information was developed during the next 17 months.
- A federal indictment was returned on March 6, 1975, more than 18 months after the alleged offenses.
- During the interval, two potential defense witnesses died, including one who allegedly would have testified that the guns belonged to him and that Lovasco lacked knowledge they were stolen.
- Lovasco moved to dismiss, asserting that the pre-indictment delay caused actual prejudice and violated constitutional protections.

## Issues

1. Whether the Sixth Amendment speedy-trial right applies to pre-indictment delay.
2. Whether pre-indictment delay that results in the loss of material defense evidence violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of the indictment (8–1).
- The Sixth Amendment speedy-trial guarantee does not apply to pre-indictment delay; it attaches only after arrest or formal charge.
- A due process claim based on pre-indictment delay requires more than prejudice; courts must also assess the government’s reasons for the delay.
- The delay was attributed to continued investigation into additional participants and related offenses and was treated as good-faith investigative delay.
- Prosecution after good-faith investigative delay does not violate due process, even if the defense was somewhat prejudiced by the passage of time.

## Legal Principles

- Statutes of limitations are the primary protection against stale criminal charges; due process provides a limited additional safeguard for pre-indictment delay.
- The Speedy Trial Clause applies only once a defendant is “accused” through arrest or formal charging.
- For pre-indictment delay to violate due process, the defendant must show (1) actual prejudice and (2) that the delay was unjustifiable when balanced against the government’s reasons.
- Proof of prejudice makes a due process claim justiciable but does not, by itself, establish a constitutional violation.
- Good-faith investigative delay is permissible; delay to gain a tactical advantage over the accused (or comparable improper purposes) may violate due process.
- Prosecutors have no constitutional duty to indict immediately upon probable cause and may delay to complete investigation and determine whether they can prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

## Conclusion

The Court held that pre-indictment delay is not governed by the Sixth Amendment and violates due process only when a defendant proves actual prejudice and the government’s delay is unjustifiable; a good-faith investigative delay, even if it causes some defense prejudice, does not require dismissal.


United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977)