## Facts

- William MacPherson, a New York City police officer and landlord, faced a $2.5 million civil lawsuit and was uninsured against a judgment.
- While the suit was pending, he withdrew and moved significant assets, including cash withdrawals over $10,000 that triggered bank currency-transaction reporting, and he provided identifying information in connection with at least one report.
- Between September 26, 2000 and January 16, 2001, MacPherson deposited $258,100 in cash into three bank accounts through thirty-two separate deposits.
- No single deposit exceeded $10,000; many deposits were clustered on the same day at different banks, commonly in the $9,000–$9,200 range.
- The government did not claim the cash was criminal proceeds; it argued the deposits were structured to avoid the federal reporting requirement for cash transactions over $10,000.
- A jury convicted MacPherson of structuring in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3).
- The district court granted a post-verdict Rule 29 motion and entered a judgment of acquittal for insufficient evidence of knowledge and intent to evade reporting.
- The government appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, was sufficient for a rational jury to find that MacPherson knew of the $10,000 currency-reporting requirement.
2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to find that MacPherson intended to evade that requirement by structuring cash deposits under 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3).
3. Whether the district court improperly reweighed competing inferences when granting a Rule 29 judgment of acquittal.

## Decision

- The Second Circuit reversed the judgment of acquittal and remanded with instructions to reinstate the jury’s guilty verdict, proceed to sentencing, and enter judgment of conviction.
- The court held that the totality of the circumstantial evidence permitted a rational jury to infer guilty knowledge and intent.
- The court concluded the district court erred by parsing the evidence in isolation and substituting its view of permissible inferences for the jury’s.

## Legal Principles

- To prove structuring under 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3), the government must show (1) structuring of transactions with a domestic financial institution, (2) a purpose to evade currency-reporting requirements, and (3) knowing and willful action, including knowledge of the reporting requirement and intent to evade it.
- Knowledge and intent may be established by circumstantial evidence, including the pattern, size, and timing of cash transactions.
- A highly regular pattern of repeated cash deposits just below $10,000, including multiple same-day deposits at different banks, can support an inference of intent to evade reporting.
- Prior exposure to CTR procedures in earlier over-$10,000 transactions can support an inference that the defendant knew the reporting rules.
- On sufficiency review and Rule 29 motions, courts must view evidence in the government’s favor and need not require the government to exclude every reasonable innocent explanation.
- Structuring is a standalone offense; proof that the funds were derived from illegal activity is not required.

## Conclusion

The Second Circuit held that a jury could reasonably infer, from MacPherson’s repeated sub-$10,000 deposits and his prior experience with over-$10,000 transactions that triggered reporting, that he knowingly and willfully structured deposits to evade federal currency-reporting requirements; the district court’s acquittal was reversed and the conviction reinstated.


United States v. MacPherson, 424 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2005)