## Facts

- Thomas J. Mancuso had a prior federal narcotics conviction (1950) that placed him within the class covered by 18 U.S.C. § 1407, which required certain narcotics offenders to register with customs officials on leaving and entering the United States.
- On January 18, 1967, Mancuso departed from John F. Kennedy Airport in New York on a BOAC flight to England, and he returned to JFK on January 24, 1967.
- Mancuso did not complete § 1407 registration forms upon either departure or reentry.
- The government showed that some notices of the registration requirement existed at JFK, but the notices were limited and not placed where Mancuso traveled; there were no notices at the BOAC terminal used for his flight.
- The trial court found as a fact that Mancuso did not have knowledge of the § 1407 registration requirement for either charged incident.
- Mancuso was convicted in the Eastern District of New York on two counts under § 1407 and received consecutive sentences (with the second sentence suspended and probation imposed), then appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether a defendant may be convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1407 for failing to register upon departure and reentry when he lacked actual knowledge, and there was no fair probability of knowledge, of the registration requirement.
2. Whether due process limits enforcement of a criminal registration statute that penalizes a passive failure to act where the government did not provide adequate notice.

## Decision

- The Second Circuit reversed Mancuso’s convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1407.
- The court held that § 1407 could not be applied to convict a person who lacked actual knowledge, and lacked a fair probability of knowledge, of the duty to register.
- The court construed § 1407 to include a notice/knowledge limitation to avoid due process problems associated with punishing a wholly passive failure to act.

## Legal Principles

- Due process bars conviction for a passive failure to comply with a registration requirement where the defendant had neither actual notice nor a fair probability of learning of the duty to register.
- A criminal statute imposing liability for nonregistration may be interpreted to require actual knowledge or probability of knowledge to avoid unconstitutional applications.
- Where the government’s notice practices are insufficient to make awareness reasonably likely (including at points of departure/entry relevant to the defendant), convictions for failure to register cannot stand.

## Conclusion

The court reversed because enforcing § 1407 against a defendant who neither knew nor was reasonably likely to know of the registration duty would violate due process principles applicable to passive noncompliance, so the statute was limited to cases involving actual or probable notice.


United States v. Mancuso, 420 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1970)