## Facts

- Federal authorities charged William R. Marion and Samuel C. Cratch with a fraudulent scheme under federal law.
- The alleged criminal conduct ended in February 1965.
- The defendants were indicted in April 1968, about three years after the alleged conduct ended.
- The defendants argued the Government knew the relevant facts and identities for years before indictment and that the delay was unjustified.
- The defendants asserted they would be hindered in defending because the case involved events and conversations from years earlier, but they did not identify specific, concrete prejudice.
- The District Court dismissed the indictment for “lack of speedy prosecution,” reasoning the defense was bound to have been seriously prejudiced by the delay.
- The United States sought direct review of the dismissal.

## Issues

1. Whether the Government could appeal the pretrial order dismissing the indictment under former 18 U.S.C. § 3731.
2. Whether the Sixth Amendment speedy-trial guarantee applies to pre-indictment (pre-accusation) delay.
3. Whether the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause required dismissal for pre-indictment delay when the indictment was returned within the statute of limitations and no actual prejudice was shown.

## Decision

- The Court held it had jurisdiction because the dismissal was a pretrial “motion in bar,” entered before jeopardy attached, and was appealable by the Government under former 18 U.S.C. § 3731.
- The Court reversed the dismissal of the indictment.
- The Court held the Sixth Amendment speedy-trial right applies only after a person becomes an “accused” through arrest, indictment, or similar formal charge; it does not apply to pre-accusation delay.
- The Court held statutes of limitations are the primary protection against stale charges arising from pre-indictment delay, and the indictment here was timely under the applicable limitations period.
- The Court held due process may bar prosecution for pre-indictment delay only upon a showing of actual prejudice to the right to a fair trial; the defendants’ claims were speculative and premature because they did not claim or prove actual prejudice.

## Legal Principles

- The Sixth Amendment speedy-trial guarantee attaches only upon formal accusation (arrest, indictment, or other official charge), not during investigative delay before accusation.
- Pre-indictment delay is generally controlled by the applicable statute of limitations as the principal safeguard against overly stale prosecutions.
- The Due Process Clause can require dismissal for pre-indictment delay only if the defendant shows actual, substantial prejudice to trial fairness; generalized assertions about faded memories or difficulty reconstructing events are insufficient on their own.
- A due process claim based on pre-indictment delay is stronger where delay is used as an intentional device to gain tactical advantage, but prejudice must still be demonstrated.

## Conclusion

The Court reinstated the indictment, ruling that the Sixth Amendment does not reach pre-indictment delay and that dismissal on due process grounds requires proof of actual prejudice; timely indictments are ordinarily governed by statutes of limitations rather than the speedy-trial clause.


United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971)