## Facts

- Major Robert Mason, an active-duty U.S. Air Force officer, used government computers to view sexually explicit images he understood to depict minors in lascivious poses.
- Mason pleaded guilty at a general court-martial to an Article 134 specification alleging his conduct was (1) prejudicial to good order and discipline (clause 1), (2) service-discrediting (clause 2), and (3) a violation of the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA) assimilated through clause 3.
- During the guilty-plea inquiry, the military judge explained that clauses 1 and 2 are distinct, “uniquely military” bases of liability and could support guilt even if the CPPA-based clause 3 theory were later invalidated.
- After Mason’s conviction, the Supreme Court held in *Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition* that portions of the CPPA criminalizing certain “virtual” child pornography were unconstitutional.
- The record in Mason’s case did not clearly establish whether the images were of actual minors or were “virtual,” and Mason challenged the providence of his plea on that basis.

## Issues

1. Whether Mason’s guilty plea was improvident because the CPPA theory incorporated under Article 134 clause 3 was later narrowed on First Amendment grounds and the record did not clarify whether the images were real or virtual.
2. Whether Mason’s admissions during the plea inquiry independently established guilt under Article 134 clauses 1 and 2, permitting affirmance on those “uniquely military” theories even if clause 3 failed.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held Mason’s guilty plea was provident as to Article 134 clauses 1 and 2.
- The court concluded Mason’s plea inquiry admissions established that his conduct was prejudicial to good order and discipline and service-discrediting, independent of the CPPA.
- The court affirmed the findings of guilty under clauses 1 and 2 and sustained the conviction on that basis notwithstanding post-plea constitutional limits on parts of the CPPA.

## Legal Principles

- Article 134’s clauses 1 and 2 create analytically distinct, military-specific offenses separate from clause 3’s assimilation of federal crimes.
- A guilty plea to Article 134 clauses 1 and 2 may remain provident even if an associated clause 3 theory incorporating a federal statute is later undermined, so long as the accused’s admissions establish the elements of clauses 1 and 2.
- A plea colloquy is not rendered unintelligent or involuntary by subsequent constitutional developments where the accused is advised that the military-specific theories of guilt stand on their own and the accused admits facts satisfying those theories.

## Conclusion

CAAF upheld Mason’s convictions under Article 134 clauses 1 and 2 because his plea admissions independently established service-discrediting and discipline-prejudicial conduct, allowing affirmance even though later First Amendment doctrine cast doubt on the CPPA-based clause 3 theory.


United States v. Mason, 60 M.J. 15 (C.A.A.F. 2004)