United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974)

Facts

  • William Earl Matlock was indicted for federal bank robbery; the prosecution relied on $4,995 seized from a bedroom closet in the house where he lived.
  • Police arrested Matlock in the front yard of the residence and did not seek his consent to search.
  • Officers were admitted by Mrs. Graff, who consented to a warrantless search and stated that she and Matlock jointly occupied a particular bedroom.
  • In that bedroom’s closet, officers found a diaper bag containing the cash.
  • At the suppression hearing, the government offered (1) Mrs. Graff’s out-of-court statements about joint occupancy and (2) evidence that she and Matlock had represented themselves as husband and wife, though not legally married.
  • The district court suppressed the evidence, requiring proof of Mrs. Graff’s actual authority to consent and excluding the proffered statements as hearsay; the court of appeals affirmed.

Issues

  1. Whether the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless search based on voluntary consent given by a third party who has common authority over, or a sufficient relationship to, the premises or effects searched.
  2. Whether hearsay and similar out-of-court evidence may be received and weighed at a suppression hearing to determine third-party authority to consent.

Decision

  • The Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
  • The Court held that the government may justify a warrantless consent search through consent given by a third party with common authority over, or other sufficient relationship to, the premises or effects.
  • The Court held it was error to apply an automatic hearsay bar at a suppression hearing; the trial judge may receive such evidence and give it appropriate weight.
  • The case was remanded for reconsideration of the suppression motion on a full record that included the excluded evidence, to determine whether Mrs. Graff in fact had common authority to consent.
  • Consent to search need not come from the defendant; valid consent may be given by a third party who possesses common authority over, or a sufficient relationship to, the premises or effects.
  • “Common authority” turns on mutual use and joint access or control for most purposes, not on property-law formalities.
  • An absent, nonconsenting co-occupant assumes the risk that another co-occupant with common authority will permit inspection of shared areas.
  • Suppression hearings are preliminary proceedings in which the court may consider hearsay; there is no automatic rule excluding it, and the judge may assign it appropriate weight.

Conclusion

The Court held that a co-occupant with common authority can validly consent to a warrantless search against an absent co-occupant, and that suppression courts may consider hearsay when determining whether such authority existed, requiring remand for reconsideration under those standards.