## Facts

- Defendants were convicted in the 1990s–early 2000s of robberies and related firearms offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
- Then-existing § 924(c) practice required “stacked” consecutive mandatory minimums for multiple § 924(c) counts charged in a single case, producing sentences of roughly 35 to 53 years.
- The First Step Act of 2018 amended § 924(c) to limit the enhanced 25-year penalty to offenders with a prior final § 924(c) conviction, effectively ending same-case stacking for new sentences.
- The First Step Act also amended 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) to allow prisoners (after exhaustion) to file compassionate-release motions directly in district court.
- Defendants moved for sentence reductions under § 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that the exceptional length of their stacked sentences and the large disparity with sentences imposed today were “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” along with individualized considerations such as youth at offense, rehabilitation, and decades already served.
- District courts granted reductions to time served, after considering the statutory requirements and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.
- The United States appealed; the cases were consolidated.

## Issues

1. Whether district courts may treat the severity of pre–First Step Act stacked § 924(c) sentences and the disparity with current law as “extraordinary and compelling reasons” under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
2. Whether U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 is an “applicable” and binding policy statement that constrains district courts on defendant-filed compassionate-release motions.
3. Whether relying on the First Step Act’s non-retroactive change to § 924(c) as part of the compassionate-release analysis improperly gives the amendment retroactive effect or violates separation of powers.

## Decision

- The Fourth Circuit affirmed the sentence-reduction orders.
- District courts may consider the length of stacked § 924(c) sentences and the magnitude of the post–First Step Act disparity in deciding whether extraordinary and compelling reasons exist.
- U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 does not bind district courts on defendant-filed motions because it was written for BOP-filed motions and has not been updated to address the amended statute.
- Considering the § 924(c) stacking change as part of an individualized § 3582(c)(1)(A) determination does not create impermissible retroactivity and does not usurp legislative or executive functions, because relief remains limited by statutory prerequisites and § 3553(a).

## Legal Principles

- After the First Step Act, when a defendant files a compassionate-release motion, there is no currently “applicable” Sentencing Commission policy statement that limits what may qualify as “extraordinary and compelling reasons”; courts may consult § 1B1.13 as guidance but are not constrained by it.
- Non-retroactivity of a sentencing amendment does not bar case-specific relief under a separate statutory mechanism that requires individualized findings, including extraordinary-and-compelling reasons and consideration of § 3553(a).
- The exceptional severity of stacked § 924(c) sentences imposed under prior law, and the large disparity between those sentences and what would be imposed today, may contribute to an extraordinary-and-compelling finding, particularly when evaluated with individualized circumstances and the § 3553(a) factors.

## Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit upheld compassionate-release reductions where district courts, unconstrained by U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 on defendant-filed motions, found extraordinary and compelling reasons based on the extreme length of pre–First Step Act stacked § 924(c) sentences, the resulting disparity with current sentencing, and individualized considerations assessed under § 3553(a).


United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2020)