## Facts

- Federal investigators developed evidence that Julia McMillon (also known as Julia Walker and Julia Bivens) led a crack-cocaine distribution organization operating in the Washington, D.C. area.
- The organization obtained cocaine from Miami and distributed crack cocaine in the D.C./Maryland area, including distribution from a Maryland residence.
- McMillon left the area after a police raid on her Maryland house, moved to Miami, and later returned to the D.C. area in 1990 accompanied by Jacques Beckwith.
- A “domino-effect” series of arrests and cooperation agreements among participants lower in the organization produced testimony against McMillon from multiple cooperating witnesses.
- A federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Virginia charged McMillon with:
  - conspiracy to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base (21 U.S.C. § 846), and
  - seven counts of distributing cocaine base on various dates (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)).
- Two distribution counts were dismissed; after trial, McMillon was convicted on the conspiracy count and the remaining distribution counts and was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment.
- During jury selection, the government used a peremptory challenge to strike an African-American female venire member. Defense counsel objected under *Batson*. The prosecutor explained the strike by pointing to non-racial characteristics (including similarity in age and parental status to McMillon) and concern that the juror might sympathize with the defendant.
- At trial, the government introduced evidence describing the conspiracy’s formation, the participants’ relationships, and other acts connected to the organization. McMillon objected that some of this material was impermissible “other acts” evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403.
- The government’s case relied in part on testimony from Jacques Beckwith, who identified McMillon as the leader of the drug ring.
- On cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to question Beckwith about alleged conduct involving manipulating drug addicts into exchanging sexual favors for access to drugs. The district court sustained the government’s objection and limited that line of questioning.

## Issues

1. Whether the government’s peremptory strike of an African-American venire member violated *Batson v. Kentucky* because the stated reasons were a pretext for race discrimination.
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by admitting “other acts” and background evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) (and Rule 403).
3. Whether limiting cross-examination of Jacques Beckwith about alleged sexual exploitation of addicts improperly restricted impeachment and violated the Confrontation Clause or otherwise constituted an abuse of discretion.

## Decision

- The Fourth Circuit affirmed McMillon’s convictions and sentence.
- The court held that the prosecutor provided a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory strike and that the district court did not clearly err in finding no purposeful discrimination under *Batson*.
- The court held that most challenged background and other-acts evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b) for non-character purposes (including explaining the conspiracy and showing knowledge/intent), and that any arguable error in admitting a disputed item was harmless in light of the strength of the government’s proof.
- The court held that the district court acted within its discretion in limiting cross-examination of Beckwith about alleged sexual conduct toward addicts, given the risk of harassment or humiliation and the limited added value for assessing truthfulness in the context of the impeachment that was allowed.

## Legal Principles

- *Batson* requires a three-step inquiry: (1) a prima facie showing of discrimination, (2) a race-neutral explanation from the proponent of the strike, and (3) a determination whether the explanation is pretext for purposeful discrimination; appellate review gives strong deference to the trial court’s factual finding on discriminatory intent.
- A peremptory strike may be supported by race-neutral reasons tied to a juror’s non-racial characteristics (such as similarity to the defendant that may suggest sympathy), so long as the trial court finds the explanation credible and not a cover for discrimination.
- Rule 404(b) generally permits evidence of other acts when offered for a proper purpose other than propensity (such as knowledge, intent, or context for the charged conduct), and such evidence remains subject to Rule 403 balancing against unfair prejudice.
- In conspiracy prosecutions, evidence that completes the story of the charged scheme or explains relationships and roles among participants may be admitted as contextual evidence rather than as forbidden character proof.
- Trial courts have discretion to control the scope and manner of cross-examination and may bar questioning that is designed mainly to harass, embarrass, or humiliate a witness; the Confrontation Clause is satisfied when the jury has enough information from permitted examination to evaluate bias and credibility.
- Even if an evidentiary ruling is mistaken, reversal is not required when the error did not substantially affect the verdict (harmless error).

## Conclusion

In *United States v. McMillon*, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Julia McMillon’s crack-distribution conspiracy and distribution convictions and 360-month sentence, ruling that the government’s peremptory strike survived *Batson*, the challenged Rule 404(b) evidence was largely admissible (and any questionable admission was harmless), and the district court acted within its discretion in limiting cross-examination of the key witness about alleged sexual exploitation of addicts.


United States v. McMillon, 14 F.3d 948 (1994)