## Facts

- On April 19, 1995, a truck bomb destroyed much of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people and injuring hundreds.
- A federal grand jury returned an eleven-count indictment charging Timothy James McVeigh with conspiracy; use of a weapon of mass destruction; destruction by explosives; and eight counts of first-degree murder of federal law-enforcement officers.
- Venue was transferred from the Western District of Oklahoma to the District of Colorado, where McVeigh was tried before a jury.
- The jury convicted McVeigh on all counts, and the district court imposed a death sentence.
- McVeigh appealed, asserting errors related to pretrial publicity, juror misconduct, exclusion of third-party-guilt and mitigation evidence, jury instructions on weapon-of-mass-destruction counts, limits on voir dire concerning sentencing views, and admission of victim-impact testimony in both the guilt and penalty phases.

## Issues

1. Whether pretrial publicity and community hostility required reversal because they denied McVeigh an impartial jury.
2. Whether alleged juror misconduct warranted a new trial due to exposure to extraneous information or nondisclosure during voir dire.
3. Whether the district court improperly excluded evidence suggesting third-party involvement in the bombing.
4. Whether the jury instructions on the weapon-of-mass-destruction charges misstated the required mens rea.
5. Whether victim-impact testimony during the guilt phase rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.
6. Whether limits on penalty-phase voir dire and mitigation evidence violated constitutional protections in a capital sentencing.
7. Whether victim-impact evidence during the penalty phase improperly produced a sentence based on emotion rather than reason.

## Decision

- The Tenth Circuit affirmed McVeigh’s convictions on all eleven counts and affirmed the death sentence.
- The court held that the change of venue, extensive juror screening, and trial safeguards defeated claims of presumed or actual prejudice from publicity.
- The court rejected juror-misconduct claims, concluding the record did not show bias or prejudicial influence on the verdict and deferring to the district court’s post-trial findings.
- The court upheld exclusion of third-party-guilt evidence as speculative and insufficiently connected to the charged offense.
- The court approved the weapon-of-mass-destruction instructions, holding the statute required knowing use, not a separate specific intent to kill.
- The court found no reversible error in admitting limited victim-impact testimony at the guilt phase given relevance, trial management, and the strength of the evidence.
- The court upheld limits on sentencing voir dire and certain mitigation evidence, finding the jury still received an adequate basis to assess bias and consider mitigating circumstances.
- The court concluded the penalty-phase victim-impact evidence was constitutionally permissible and controlled such that the sentencing determination remained tied to the instructed factors.

## Legal Principles

- Extensive pretrial publicity does not require reversal absent a showing of presumed prejudice or actual juror inability to decide based on the evidence presented at trial; change of venue and careful voir dire are relevant safeguards.
- A new trial for juror exposure to extraneous information requires a showing that the information had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the verdict; appellate courts generally defer to trial-court factfinding after evidentiary hearings.
- Third-party-guilt evidence is admissible only when it tends to directly connect a third person to the commission of the offense; speculative allegations may be excluded under relevance and unfair-prejudice standards.
- For the charged weapon-of-mass-destruction offense, proof that the defendant knowingly used the device under the statute suffices; the statute does not require proof of a separate specific intent to kill particular victims.
- Victim-impact evidence violates due process only if it is so unduly prejudicial that it makes the proceeding fundamentally unfair; careful limitation and context affect the analysis.
- In capital cases, defendants must have meaningful opportunity to present mitigation, but trial courts may exclude marginally relevant or confusing material and may prevent sentencing from becoming a relitigation of guilt or collateral disputes.
- Victim-impact testimony at capital sentencing is permissible when controlled and when the jury is instructed to base its decision on the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors.

## Conclusion

The Tenth Circuit held that McVeigh’s trial and capital sentencing complied with constitutional and evidentiary requirements despite extraordinary publicity and emotionally charged evidence, and it affirmed both the convictions and the death sentence.


United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 1998)