## Facts

- Federal prosecutors charged Juan A. Meises and Jose L. Reyes-Guerrero with a single count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, arising from a reverse-sting operation for an intended multi-kilogram cocaine purchase.
- Law enforcement, including Puerto Rico Police Sergeant Roberto Cruz and a cooperating informant, posed as sellers during negotiations with alleged traffickers, including a third participant, Dario Pereyra-Rubis.
- Meises and Reyes-Guerrero arrived at the meeting location with Rubis in a minivan containing about $100,000 in cash and were arrested.
- At trial, the government relied heavily on testimony from the informant and from Sergeant Cruz, who testified both as a fact witness and as an “overview” witness describing the alleged conspiracy and participants’ roles.
- The jury convicted both defendants. The district court later recognized problems with the overview testimony but denied relief as harmless.
- On appeal, defendants challenged (among other points) the overview testimony, testimony indirectly conveying an inculpatory out-of-court statement by Rubis (who did not testify), the exclusion of a defense audiotape (Meises), and the sufficiency of the evidence (Reyes-Guerrero).

## Issues

1. Whether the district court improperly permitted extensive “overview” testimony and lay opinions from the lead agent that exceeded personal knowledge and effectively told the jury how to decide the case, in violation of Federal Rules of Evidence 602 and 701.
2. Whether the court violated the Confrontation Clause by admitting testimony that indirectly conveyed a non-testifying co-defendant’s inculpatory statement implicating the defendants.
3. Whether excluding a defense audiotape recorded on the arrest date was evidentiary error.
4. Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support Reyes-Guerrero’s conspiracy conviction.

## Decision

- The First Circuit vacated both convictions and remanded for a new trial.
- The court held the lead agent’s “overview” testimony was improperly admitted under Rules 602 and 701.
- The court held the district court also erred by allowing testimony that revealed, in substance, an inculpatory out-of-court statement by Rubis, who did not testify, creating a Confrontation Clause problem.
- The court concluded these two errors were significant and not harmless in a case turning heavily on the informant’s credibility.
- The court rejected Reyes-Guerrero’s insufficiency claim, concluding the properly admitted evidence could support a conviction at a correctly conducted retrial.

## Legal Principles

- Under Federal Rule of Evidence 602, a witness may not testify to matters beyond personal knowledge; an investigating agent may not supply a narrative of key events the agent did not observe.
- Under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, lay opinion must be helpful and must not merely direct the jury to a conclusion the jury is equally able to draw; role-labeling opinions (e.g., “broker” or “buyer”) that endorse the prosecution’s theory risk usurping the jury’s function.
- In multi-defendant prosecutions, “overview” testimony by a lead agent can improperly gain persuasive force from the agent’s authority and may prejudice the defendant when it synthesizes the government’s case rather than reporting admissible observations.
- The Confrontation Clause bars the government from placing before the jury, directly or indirectly, the substance of a non-testifying co-defendant’s inculpatory statement when the defendant cannot cross-examine the declarant.
- Harmless-error review is especially demanding where improperly admitted evidence bolsters a central informant and supplies corroboration on disputed participation in a conspiracy.

## Conclusion

The First Circuit ordered a new trial because the government’s case was materially strengthened by improper lead-agent overview testimony and by testimony that effectively conveyed a non-testifying co-defendant’s accusation, errors that could not be treated as harmless given the credibility-driven proof at trial.


United States v. Meises, 645 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 2011)