## Facts

- Shawn Joseph Miller operated two Ohio corporations that purported to buy and sell credit-card debt portfolios to brokers and collection agencies.
- From September 2002 through December 2003, Miller used the companies to sell non-existent or fraudulent debt portfolios, including portfolios he did not own and portfolios listing debts not actually owed by the supposed debtors.
- Miller maintained a corporate checking account at a bank in Ohio; a bank employee who opened the account later became a potential witness.
- After Miller learned the FBI was investigating him, he told the bank employee that if she spoke to anyone about the investigation, including the FBI, he would sue her for defamation.
- The bank employee testified she understood the statement as a threat intended to deter her from speaking with investigators.

## Issues

1. Whether sufficient evidence supported the conviction for witness tampering under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3) where the alleged threat was a warning that the defendant would sue a potential witness for defamation if she spoke to the FBI.
2. Whether requiring the defendant to wear an electronic stun belt during trial violated the constitutional right to a fair trial.
3. Whether the district court plainly erred by not ordering a competency hearing sua sponte.
4. Whether an above-Guidelines prison sentence was substantively unreasonable.

## Decision

- The Sixth Circuit affirmed Miller’s convictions for wire fraud, money laundering, and witness tampering.
- The court held the evidence was sufficient for the § 1512(b)(3) conviction because a jury could view the defamation-suit warning, in context, as intimidation or a threat intended to prevent communication with law enforcement.
- The court rejected the fair-trial challenge to the stun belt because the record did not show undue prejudice or interference with trial participation.
- The court found no plain error in the absence of a sua sponte competency hearing because the record did not provide substantial reason to doubt competence.
- The court upheld the above-Guidelines prison term as substantively reasonable but ordered a limited remand to correct the supervised-release term.

## Legal Principles

- Under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3), witness tampering includes knowingly using intimidation, threats, or corrupt persuasion with intent to hinder, delay, or prevent communication to law enforcement about a federal offense.
- “Threats” under § 1512(b)(3) are not limited to threats of physical harm; nonphysical threats, including threatened civil litigation, can qualify when used as improper means to deter cooperation with investigators.
- Sufficiency of the evidence for § 1512(b)(3) may be established through contextual proof of intent, including the timing of the statement relative to an investigation and the target’s testimony about perceiving the statement as threatening.
- Security restraints at trial violate due process only when they create unjustified prejudice or materially interfere with the defendant’s ability to participate in the defense, as shown by the record.
- A district court must order a competency hearing when there is substantial reason to doubt competence; absent such indicia in the record, failure to act sua sponte is not reversible error under plain-error review.
- Above-Guidelines sentences are upheld when supported by adequate reasons tied to statutory sentencing factors; discrete sentencing errors (such as supervised-release terms) may warrant limited remand without disturbing convictions.

## Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed Miller’s convictions and prison sentence, holding that a threat to sue a potential witness for defamation can constitute intimidation under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3) when intended to deter communication with federal investigators, and remanded only to correct the supervised-release component of the sentence.


United States v. Miller, 531 F.3d 340 (6th Cir. 2008)