## Facts

- Federal and state investigators linked the death of Florida Highway Patrol Trooper James Fulford to a large, multi-state crack-cocaine enterprise operating across several southeastern states.
- A third superseding indictment charged multiple defendants, including seven appellants, with RICO conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)), drug-trafficking conspiracy (21 U.S.C. § 846), and related substantive offenses, including a count tied to Trooper Fulford’s death (Count XXVIII).
- At an eight-week jury trial in the Northern District of Florida, the seven appellants were convicted on multiple counts, including RICO and/or drug conspiracy; six appellants were convicted on Count XXVIII.
- The evidence showed the enterprise used violence to protect its drug business and had committed prior lethal violence against a rival dealer.
- After concerns that a participant’s girlfriend might report a prior killing to authorities, a conspirator built a pipe bomb concealed inside a microwave oven to kill her as a potential witness.
- On February 1, 1992, Trooper Fulford stopped a speeding rental car in Jefferson County, Florida; after arresting the driver for driving without a license and obtaining consent to search, he opened a gift-wrapped package in the trunk containing the microwave.
- The device exploded when opened, killing Trooper Fulford; the actual victim differed from the intended target.
- On Count XXVIII, several appellants were convicted based on Pinkerton co-conspirator liability; one appellant was also convicted on an aiding-and-abetting theory, and another based on his role in creating the bomb.

## Issues

1. Whether Trooper Fulford’s death could be attributed to co-conspirators under Pinkerton where only some conspirators planned or executed the bombing and the actual victim was not the intended target.
2. Whether the bombing and resulting homicide were committed in furtherance of the charged conspiracies and were reasonably foreseeable to each appellant.
3. Whether the evidence and the district court’s Pinkerton instruction permitted the jury to convict on the murder-related count.

## Decision

- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences, including the Count XXVIII murder-related convictions.
- The court held the jury could properly apply Pinkerton because the bombing plot furthered the conspiracies by attempting to eliminate a potential witness.
- The court held lethal violence was reasonably foreseeable within this extensive drug enterprise given its scope, financial stakes, and prior use of deadly force.
- The court rejected the argument that the causal chain was too attenuated, concluding Pinkerton does not require that conspirators foresee the precise identity of the eventual victim.
- Applying a deferential review of the jury’s verdict, the court found sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find Pinkerton elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

## Legal Principles

- Under Pinkerton, a conspirator may be liable for substantive offenses committed by a co-conspirator if the acts were in furtherance of the conspiracy and reasonably foreseeable.
- An act aimed at preventing detection or prosecution of a conspiracy, including killing a potential witness, can constitute conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy.
- Foreseeability under Pinkerton focuses on the general type of criminal conduct and risk created by the conspiracy, not the exact manner of commission or the specific identity of the victim.
- In evaluating sufficiency of the evidence after a jury verdict, appellate review asks whether a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt when viewing the evidence in the government’s favor.

## Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit held that a witness-elimination bombing tied to a large drug/RICO conspiracy supported Pinkerton liability for Trooper Fulford’s death, affirming murder-related convictions because the plot furthered the conspiracies and the resulting lethal harm was reasonably foreseeable to the conspirators.


United States v. Mothersill, 87 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 1996)