## Facts

- Federal prosecutors charged multiple defendants with conspiracy and substantive violations of federal peonage and involuntary-servitude statutes (18 U.S.C. §§ 1581, 1583, 1584, and 371).
- The indictment alleged defendants recruited poor, non-English-speaking Indonesian domestic servants to travel to the United States.
- Defendants allegedly paid the servants very little and required them to “work off” transportation-related debts through domestic labor in defendants’ homes.
- Defendants allegedly withheld servants’ passports and return airline tickets.
- Servants allegedly worked up to 15 hours per day, seven days a week, and were routinely denied vacations.
- The servants allegedly lacked work authorization, identification, and realistic alternative employment options, contributing to dependence on the defendants.
- In some counts, defendants allegedly warned servants that attempts to leave would result in being reported to authorities and arrested due to immigration or documentation status.
- The district court dismissed most substantive counts, reasoning the charging documents did not allege “holding” in peonage or involuntary servitude because they did not allege use or threatened use of law or physical force, and it also considered vagueness concerns under a broader reading.
- The United States appealed the dismissals.

## Issues

1. Whether violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581, 1583, and 1584 require allegations of the use or threatened use of law or physical force to constitute a “holding” in peonage or involuntary servitude.
2. Whether the statutes are unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause if interpreted to reach intentional coercion not involving law or physical force.

## Decision

- The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the substantive counts and remanded.
- The court held that peonage and involuntary-servitude violations may be established through coercive conduct other than the use or threatened use of law or physical force.
- The court held the indictment and bill of particulars sufficiently alleged a prohibited “holding,” including document retention, debt-based compulsion, and conditions restricting meaningful freedom to leave.
- The court rejected the vagueness challenge, concluding the statutes provided adequate notice when applied to intentional schemes that coerce labor by overpowering the workers’ will.

## Legal Principles

- “Holding” a person in peonage or involuntary servitude under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581, 1583, and 1584 is not limited to compulsion by physical force or explicit legal coercion.
- Involuntary servitude may be shown where a defendant intentionally uses coercive means that overbear a worker’s will and effectively deprive the worker of a rational choice to leave.
- Withholding passports and return tickets, isolating vulnerable workers, and leveraging debt and lack of lawful status can constitute coercion supporting peonage or involuntary-servitude charges.
- A statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied when it gives ordinary notice that intentional coercion designed to compel labor is prohibited; the statutes do not criminalize merely harsh working conditions absent such coercion.
- An indictment is sufficient if it alleges conduct that, if proven, satisfies the statutory elements under the correct legal standard, even if some victims may have managed to leave.

## Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit held that federal peonage and involuntary-servitude statutes reach intentional, nonphysical coercion that effectively compels labor, and it reinstated dismissed counts because the charging documents adequately alleged a coercive scheme involving document confiscation, debt pressure, and constrained ability to leave.


United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1984)