## Facts

- Robert Neapolitan was a Cook County Sheriff’s Police Department investigator, employed with co-defendants until indicted in 1984.
- The prosecution alleged an auto-theft “chop shop” operation in which stolen cars were dismantled and parts sold in interstate commerce.
- The government’s theory was that corrupt law-enforcement officers provided protection to the operation in exchange for bribes.
- Neapolitan’s role was more limited than others’, but included soliciting at least one cash bribe at the chop shop and making statements supporting continuation of the criminal activity.
- Neapolitan was charged with mail fraud counts and a racketeering conspiracy count under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), and was convicted after trial.

## Issues

1. Whether a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) requires proof that each conspirator personally agreed to commit two or more predicate racketeering acts.
2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to show Neapolitan knowingly agreed to further a RICO violation involving an enterprise conducting its affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.
3. Whether the indictment adequately stated the elements of a § 1962(d) offense and provided sufficient notice and double-jeopardy protection.

## Decision

- The Seventh Circuit affirmed Neapolitan’s conviction.
- The court held that § 1962(d) is satisfied when a defendant agrees, with knowledge of the objective, that the enterprise’s affairs will be conducted through a pattern of racketeering activity.
- The government was not required to prove Neapolitan personally agreed to commit two predicate acts.
- The evidence permitted a finding that Neapolitan solicited a bribe and agreed the ongoing criminal pattern at the chop shop would continue, supporting the existence of the requisite agreement.
- The indictment was sufficient because it identified the charged offense, described the enterprise and the alleged pattern of racketeering activity, and provided adequate notice and protection against double jeopardy.

## Legal Principles

- RICO conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) focuses on the defendant’s agreement and knowledge that the conspiracy’s goal is a substantive RICO violation—conducting an enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.
- A conspirator need not personally commit, or personally agree to commit, two or more predicate acts to be liable under § 1962(d).
- Substantive RICO liability and RICO conspiracy liability are distinct: the “pattern” requirement applies to the substantive violation, while the conspiracy provision turns on agreement to further the pattern-based objective.
- An indictment is sufficient if it states the elements of the offense, informs the defendant of the nature of the charge to allow preparation of a defense, and permits assessment of potential double-jeopardy issues.

## Conclusion

The court upheld Neapolitan’s RICO conspiracy conviction, ruling that § 1962(d) requires proof of a knowing agreement to further an enterprise’s conduct through a pattern of racketeering activity, not proof that the defendant personally agreed to commit multiple predicate acts, and concluding the evidence and indictment met that standard.


United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1986)