## Facts

- Roy Arthur Nelson and Frank Brewton were jointly indicted for robbing a federally insured bank under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a); Brewton was found incompetent, and Nelson was tried alone.
- Brewton entered the bank and presented a written demand note; a teller gave him $627, including five marked $20 bills.
- During the robbery, an unidentified person was seen in a nearby car with the engine racing.
- Brewton ran from the bank to that car, entered on the passenger side, and the car immediately sped away.
- A police officer soon saw the same car with two male occupants; the car fled and a high-speed chase followed.
- During the chase, Nelson exited from the driver’s side and ran; he was captured with $125 on his person.
- The car then crashed; Brewton emerged and was arrested after attempting to hide $502, including the marked bills, under a nearby building.
- About 10–15 minutes elapsed between the robbery and Nelson’s flight from the car.

## Issues

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Nelson, charged as a principal, had the specific knowledge and intent to participate in the bank robbery rather than merely assisting after the fact.
2. Whether the jury was legally barred from drawing “an inference upon an inference” to conclude Nelson was the getaway driver and knew of the robbery.
3. Whether circumstantial evidence must “exclude every hypothesis but that of guilt” to sustain a conviction.
4. Whether the district court erred by denying a motion for acquittal and refusing proposed defense instructions restricting the use of circumstantial evidence and inferential reasoning.

## Decision

- The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction.
- Assuming arguendo that the government had to prove Nelson’s actual knowledge that Brewton intended to rob the bank, the court held the circumstantial evidence permitted the jury to so find beyond a reasonable doubt.
- The court rejected a categorical rule against basing one reasonable inference on another, so long as each inference is supported by the evidence.
- The court rejected the claim that circumstantial evidence must exclude every innocent hypothesis; the proper question is whether the evidence permits guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
- The district court properly denied acquittal and properly refused the requested limiting instructions.

## Legal Principles

- A conviction may rest on circumstantial evidence if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Federal law does not impose a rigid prohibition on drawing one reasonable inference from another; the limit is speculation unsupported by evidence.
- Circumstantial evidence need not exclude every possible innocent explanation; it is enough that the jury may reasonably find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Trial courts may refuse instructions that misstate these standards by demanding exclusion of innocence or banning inferential chains.

## Conclusion

The court upheld Nelson’s bank-robbery conviction because the coordinated flight, short time frame, and Nelson’s role as the driver supported reasonable inferences of knowing participation, and because federal law permits such inferential use of circumstantial evidence without requiring exclusion of every innocent hypothesis.


United States v. Nelson, 419 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1969)