## Facts

- Patricia Lynn Opager was prosecuted in the Southern District of Florida for a single undercover cocaine transaction.
- On February 23, 1977, Opager sold about one pound of high-purity cocaine to three buyers, including two law enforcement officers and an informant, Phillip Posner.
- A jury convicted Opager of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute and distributing cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
- Opager received concurrent 54-month sentences and a three-year special parole term.
- Opager asserted entrapment, testifying she had not previously sold cocaine and was pressured by Posner and officers.
- To rebut entrapment and show predisposition, the government relied heavily on Posner’s testimony that he worked with Opager at a beauty salon in 1974 and 1976 and saw her use and sell cocaine during those periods.
- Opager sought to impeach Posner by offering beauty-salon business and payroll records to show she and Posner did not work together in 1974, contradicting his account of observing her cocaine dealings then.
- The trial court excluded the records under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b), treating them as impermissible extrinsic evidence offered to attack Posner’s character for truthfulness.
- Before trial, a magistrate ordered (and the district court affirmed) that the government disclose Posner’s identity and whereabouts; the government did not comply, preventing Opager from locating or interviewing him before trial.

## Issues

1. Whether Rule 608(b) barred admission of business and payroll records offered to contradict the informant’s testimony on a material fact central to predisposition and the entrapment defense.
2. Whether the government’s failure to comply with a court order to disclose the informant’s whereabouts prejudiced the defense and required reversal.

## Decision

- The Fifth Circuit reversed the convictions and remanded.
- The court held the salon business/payroll records were admissible because they were offered to impeach Posner on a material factual assertion, not merely to show general untruthfulness under Rule 608(b).
- The court held the government’s noncompliance with the disclosure order regarding the informant’s whereabouts prejudiced Opager’s ability to prepare and present her defense.
- The court found these two errors sufficient for reversal and did not rely on Opager’s other appellate arguments as grounds for decision.

## Legal Principles

- Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) limits extrinsic evidence used solely to prove specific instances of conduct to attack or support a witness’s character for truthfulness, but it does not bar extrinsic evidence offered to contradict a witness on a material fact.
- When entrapment is asserted, predisposition becomes a central issue; impeachment evidence that directly challenges key predisposition testimony is material and may be proved by extrinsic evidence.
- Government failure to comply with a court order requiring disclosure of an informant’s whereabouts can constitute reversible error when it prevents meaningful pretrial investigation and preparation regarding a critical prosecution witness.

## Conclusion

The court reversed because the trial court improperly treated material-fact impeachment as barred character impeachment under Rule 608(b), and because the government’s violation of a disclosure order deprived the defense of a fair opportunity to investigate and confront the informant whose testimony was central to disproving entrapment.


United States v. Opager, 589 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1979)