## Facts

- Three forklifts were stolen in California and later recovered in the Reno–Sparks area of Nevada.
- James Henry Patterson obtained the first forklift in October 1978 after purchasing it from two men he met at a casino in Sparks, Nevada.
- In late April 1979, a contractor working for Patterson, Manuel Crummett, purchased a second forklift from two men outside Patterson’s house; Patterson later lent it out, and it ultimately reached a repair shop where its stolen status was discovered.
- A third forklift appeared at Patterson’s house at about the same time as the second; Patterson bought it from two men who returned the next day, whom the government identified as codefendants Gerald Heidinger and Steve Austin.
- Evidence showed Patterson and his nephew/employee, James McKay, altered at least one forklift after delivery, including replacing an ignition system; other evidence suggested removal of locks and panels.
- McKay testified before a grand jury that Patterson admitted the forklifts were stolen, but at trial McKay claimed he could not remember Patterson making such statements.
- The district court admitted McKay’s grand jury testimony as a recorded recollection under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(5).
- Patterson was convicted in federal district court of two counts of receiving stolen motor vehicles (18 U.S.C. § 2313) and one count of conspiracy to transport stolen motor vehicles (18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 2312); Heidinger and Austin were acquitted by the same jury.

## Issues

1. Whether McKay’s grand jury testimony was properly admitted as a recorded recollection under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(5) when the witness claimed lack of memory at trial.
2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove Patterson knew the forklifts were stolen, as required for conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2313.
3. Whether Patterson’s conspiracy conviction could stand when the named alleged coconspirators were acquitted and the indictment also alleged conspiracy with “unknown persons.”
4. Whether claimed errors in jury instructions or limitations on defense closing argument required reversal.

## Decision

- The court affirmed admission of McKay’s grand jury testimony under Rule 803(5).
- The court affirmed Patterson’s convictions for receiving stolen property under 18 U.S.C. § 2313, holding the evidence sufficient to prove knowledge.
- The court reversed Patterson’s conspiracy conviction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 2312, finding the evidence insufficient to prove a conspiracy with unidentified persons after the acquittals of the alleged coconspirators.
- The court found no reversible error in the jury instructions or in the trial court’s limitations on defense closing argument.

## Legal Principles

- A prior statement may be admitted as a recorded recollection under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(5) when the witness once had knowledge, cannot fully and accurately recall at trial, the record was made or adopted when memory was fresh, and it accurately reflects the witness’s knowledge.
- On sufficiency review, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution; the conviction stands if any rational jury could find the elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Knowledge that property is stolen under 18 U.S.C. § 2313 may be proven by circumstantial evidence, including suspicious purchase conditions, post-receipt alterations consistent with concealment, and admissible statements reflecting awareness of theft.
- When an indictment charges conspiracy with named persons and “unknown persons,” a conspiracy conviction cannot rest on the “unknown persons” allegation without evidence of an agreement involving participants other than acquitted alleged coconspirators.
- Alleged instructional or argument-management errors warrant reversal only if they misstate the law or affect substantial rights when the charge and proceedings are considered as a whole.

## Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit upheld Patterson’s receiving-stolen-property convictions, concluding that McKay’s grand jury testimony was admissible as a recorded recollection and that the evidence supported a finding of knowledge, but it set aside the conspiracy conviction because the record did not support an agreement with unidentified conspirators once the alleged coconspirators were acquitted.


United States v. Patterson, 678 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1982)