## Facts

- Peoni sold counterfeit bills to Regno in the Bronx.
- Regno resold the same counterfeit bills to Dorsey, also in the Bronx.
- All three men knew the bills were counterfeit.
- Dorsey was arrested in Brooklyn while attempting to pass the counterfeit bills.
- Peoni was prosecuted on the theory that Dorsey’s possession was a natural and foreseeable consequence of Peoni’s initial sale to Regno.

## Issues

1. Whether Peoni aided and abetted Dorsey’s possession of counterfeit bills under the federal accessory statute by selling the bills to Regno, who later sold them to Dorsey.
2. Whether Peoni joined a conspiracy whose objective included Dorsey’s possession of the counterfeit bills, despite no direct agreement between Peoni and Dorsey.
3. Whether knowledge that one’s conduct may facilitate another’s crime suffices for accomplice liability, or whether a purpose to facilitate is required.

## Decision

- The Second Circuit reversed the convictions to the extent they rested on treating Peoni as an accessory to Dorsey’s possession and as a conspirator in a plan for Dorsey to possess the bills.
- The court held the evidence did not show Peoni acted with the required intent to bring about or assist Dorsey’s later possession.
- The court held the evidence did not establish an agreement or shared plan extending from Peoni to Dorsey.

## Legal Principles

- Aiding-and-abetting liability under the federal accessory statute requires more than but-for causation or foreseeable downstream criminal acts.
- The statutory terms “aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or procures” require that the defendant associate himself with the venture and act with a purpose to bring about or facilitate the principal’s offense.
- Mere knowledge that a subsequent crime is likely, or even expected, from one’s conduct is insufficient without a purposive intent to assist the principal’s specific criminal act.
- Conspiracy requires an agreement and shared unlawful objective; separate transactions (Peoni–Regno and Regno–Dorsey) do not establish a single conspiracy absent proof of a common plan encompassing the later actor.

## Conclusion

Because the evidence showed only that Peoni sold counterfeit bills to Regno, not that he intended to aid Dorsey’s later possession or agreed to a plan involving Dorsey, the Second Circuit found the proof insufficient for aiding-and-abetting or conspiracy liability tied to Dorsey’s possession.


United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1938)