## Facts

- Cornelius Peoples and Xavier Lightfoot were charged in federal court with aiding and abetting the murder of a federal witness, Jovan Ross, and related offenses connected to a credit-union robbery.
- Ross, Lightfoot’s roommate, cooperated with law enforcement in the robbery investigation, including permitting a search that recovered stolen items.
- After defendants learned of Ross’s cooperation, Ross was murdered; the prosecution’s theory was that defendants arranged the killing to prevent Ross from testifying.
- While jailed on the robbery charges, Lightfoot made monitored telephone calls with Peoples; the government introduced recordings at trial.
- The government asserted the conversations used slang and “code” to discuss hiring a hit man to kill Ross.
- The government called FBI Special Agent Joan Neal, who repeatedly interpreted the recorded conversations as coded discussions about arranging a murder-for-hire.
- Over defense objection, the district court admitted Neal’s interpretations as lay opinion testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 701.
- A jury convicted both defendants, and the court imposed life imprisonment without parole.

## Issues

1. Whether the district court abused its discretion by admitting an FBI agent’s investigatory “interpretation” of recorded conversations as lay opinion under Federal Rule of Evidence 701 when the testimony effectively conveyed conclusions about defendants’ guilt.
2. Whether the error, if any, was harmless given the centrality of the recordings and the agent’s role at trial.
3. Whether other trial-management and evidentiary matters, including an anonymous jury and a challenged prosecutorial statement, required reversal or a mistrial.

## Decision

- The Eighth Circuit reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial.
- The court held the district court abused its discretion by admitting Agent Neal’s interpretive testimony as lay opinion because it was not grounded in firsthand perception and effectively told the jury what the conversations “meant.”
- The court concluded the error was not harmless because the testimony went to the central disputed question and likely carried substantial weight due to Neal’s status as an FBI agent.
- The court determined the anonymous-jury ruling, the handling of the prosecutor’s statement, and other challenged evidentiary rulings did not independently warrant reversal.

## Legal Principles

- Federal Rule of Evidence 701 permits lay opinions only when they are rationally based on the witness’s perception, helpful to the factfinder, and not based on specialized knowledge within Rule 702.
- A law-enforcement witness may not present investigatory inferences as “lay” interpretations of recorded conversations when the opinions are derived from the overall investigation rather than firsthand perception of the events discussed.
- Testimony that effectively instructs the jury that ambiguous conversations establish criminal intent or guilt improperly intrudes on the jury’s function.
- When such opinion testimony addresses a central disputed issue and is likely to be credited because of the witness’s law-enforcement status, admission may be prejudicial and require a new trial.

## Conclusion

The court ordered a new trial because admitting an FBI agent’s investigation-based “interpretation” of recorded calls as Rule 701 lay opinion improperly displaced the jury’s role and, given its importance to the prosecution’s theory, was not harmless.


United States v. Peoples, 250 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2001)