## Facts

- A Texas state court entered an agreed civil protective order against Zackey Rahimi after an alleged assault of his ex-girlfriend.
- The order found Rahimi had committed family violence and that future violence was likely; it restrained him from threatening or harassing the protected person and prohibited firearm possession.
- While subject to the order, Rahimi was involved in multiple shootings in the Arlington, Texas area over a short period.
- Police executed a search warrant at Rahimi’s home and found a rifle and a pistol.
- Rahimi admitted he possessed the firearms and knew he was subject to the protective order.

## Issues

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which bars firearm possession by persons subject to certain domestic-violence protective orders, is constitutional under the Second Amendment after the Supreme Court’s decision in Bruen.
2. Whether the government showed that § 922(g)(8) is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation, as Bruen requires.

## Decision

- The court reversed the district court, vacated Rahimi’s conviction, and held § 922(g)(8) facially unconstitutional.
- The court concluded Rahimi’s conduct (possessing firearms) fell within the Second Amendment’s textual coverage because he was among “the people.”
- Applying Bruen, the court held the government failed to identify sufficiently analogous historical regulations to justify § 922(g)(8)’s categorical ban on possession.
- The court rejected policy and public-safety arguments as an alternative to the required historical showing.

## Legal Principles

- Under Bruen, if the Second Amendment’s plain text covers the conduct, the regulation is presumptively unconstitutional unless the government proves it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.
- References in Bruen to “law-abiding, responsible” citizens describe typical litigants and do not categorically exclude persons subject to civil orders from “the people” protected by the Second Amendment.
- Historical analogues must be “representative” and sufficiently comparable in purpose and burden; generalized claims about dangerousness are insufficient without adequate historical support.
- Founding-era surety laws and “going armed”/affray laws were not adequate analogues where they primarily imposed bond requirements or punished threatening conduct, rather than imposing prospective, status-based, possession bans triggered by civil protective orders.
- Interest balancing and means-end scrutiny cannot sustain modern firearm restrictions absent the historically grounded justification Bruen demands, even where the law serves serious public-safety goals.

## Conclusion

The Fifth Circuit held that § 922(g)(8)’s firearm-possession ban for persons under qualifying domestic-violence protective orders could not be justified by adequate historical analogues under Bruen and therefore violated the Second Amendment on its face, requiring reversal and vacatur of Rahimi’s conviction.


United States v. Rahimi, 61 F.4th 443 (5th Cir. 2023)