## Facts

- The United States charged William P. Reilly by one-count information with a Class A misdemeanor under the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act (Ocean Dumping Act), alleging a violation of 33 U.S.C. § 1411(a).
- The information alleged that Reilly, without a permit, knowingly transported and caused to be transported on the M/V *Khian Sea* “material” from the United States for the purpose of dumping it into ocean waters.
- The “material” was incinerator ash or similar waste covered by the statute’s broad definition of “material.”
- Reilly moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12, arguing the charging document failed to allege the required mens rea for criminal penalties under 33 U.S.C. § 1415(b).

## Issues

1. Whether “knowingly violates” in 33 U.S.C. § 1415(b) requires proof (and pleading) that the defendant knew of the statutory prohibition in § 1411(a), as opposed to knowingly engaging in the prohibited conduct.
2. Whether an information is insufficient if it alleges that the defendant knowingly transported material for the purpose of ocean dumping without a permit, but does not allege knowledge of § 1411(a) itself.

## Decision

- The court denied the motion to dismiss.
- The court held that § 1415(b) does not require the government to allege or prove that the defendant knew of § 1411(a) or the legal prohibition.
- The court concluded the information was sufficient because it alleged the essential elements: knowing transportation of material from the United States, for the purpose of dumping into ocean waters, without a permit.

## Legal Principles

- In a public-welfare regulatory statute, “knowingly violates” generally requires awareness of the defendant’s conduct and attendant factual circumstances, not knowledge that the conduct is unlawful or awareness of the specific statutory provision.
- For Ocean Dumping Act criminal penalties under 33 U.S.C. § 1415(b), the government must prove that the defendant knowingly engaged in conduct that satisfies § 1411(a)’s elements (including the purpose to dump), but need not prove knowledge of the statute or permit requirement as a matter of law.
- An information satisfies Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c) if it fairly informs the defendant of the charge by alleging the elements of the offense and the core facts (conduct, location, purpose, and absence of permit) consistent with the court’s construction of the mens rea requirement.

## Conclusion

The court construed the Ocean Dumping Act’s “knowingly violates” requirement to demand knowledge of the defendant’s actions and relevant facts, not knowledge of the statute, and therefore upheld the information charging Reilly with knowingly transporting material from the United States for the purpose of ocean dumping without a permit.


United States v. Reilly, 827 F. Supp. 1076 (D. Del. 1993)