## Facts

- Eddie Samir Rodríguez-Berríos, a Puerto Rico police officer, divorced Yesenia Ortiz-Acosta in 1999 after a marriage that produced one child.
- Ortiz disappeared on April 15, 1999 while driving her car in Guayama, Puerto Rico.
- About two weeks later, Ortiz’s burned-out car was found in a remote area; the vehicle appeared to have been burned with an accelerant, and Ortiz’s body was never located.
- The government’s theory was that Rodríguez-Berríos took Ortiz’s vehicle by force with intent to cause serious bodily harm or death, killed her, and burned the car.
- A federal grand jury indicted Rodríguez-Berríos and two others for conspiracy to commit carjacking, carjacking resulting in death, and using fire to commit the felonies; charges against co-defendants were dismissed, and only the § 2119(3) count proceeded against Rodríguez-Berríos.
- At trial, the government introduced evidence of prior abuse, stalking, and threats by Rodríguez-Berríos toward Ortiz, including witness testimony recounting statements Ortiz had made describing her fear and his conduct.
- The district court admitted substantial portions of Ortiz’s out-of-court statements over hearsay and prejudice objections, often under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) (then-existing state of mind).
- The defense sought to admit recorded phone calls to show Ortiz’s tone suggested joking rather than fear; the district court excluded the recordings as improper impeachment and minimally probative.
- The district court excluded a proposed defense expert on eyewitness identification.
- A government agent briefly mentioned a polygraph examination; the court denied a mistrial and gave a curative instruction.
- The jury convicted Rodríguez-Berríos of carjacking resulting in death, and the court imposed a life sentence.

## Issues

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the intent element of 18 U.S.C. § 2119(3): intent to cause death or serious bodily harm at the time of the taking.
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by admitting Ortiz’s out-of-court statements about fear, abuse, and threats under hearsay exceptions and Rule 403.
3. Whether the district court erred by excluding recorded phone conversations offered to impeach the government’s evidence of Ortiz’s fear.
4. Whether the district court abused its discretion by excluding expert testimony on eyewitness identification under Rule 702/Daubert principles.
5. Whether the fleeting polygraph reference required a mistrial despite a curative instruction.

## Decision

- The First Circuit affirmed the conviction and judgment.
- The court held the evidence, including circumstantial proof and admissions, was sufficient for a rational jury to find the § 2119(3) intent element beyond a reasonable doubt.
- The court found no reversible error in admitting Ortiz’s statements; many were properly admitted to show her state of mind and, in any event, any arguable error was harmless.
- The court upheld exclusion of the recorded calls as within the trial court’s discretion over relevance and impeachment.
- The court upheld exclusion of the eyewitness-identification expert as within the trial court’s discretion under Rule 702.
- The court held the polygraph mention, addressed by instruction and not accompanied by results, did not warrant a mistrial.

## Legal Principles

- For 18 U.S.C. § 2119(3), the government must prove that, at the moment of taking or attempting to take the vehicle, the defendant intended to cause death or serious bodily harm; intent may be proven through circumstantial evidence.
- A conviction must be sustained if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could find the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) permits admission of statements reflecting a declarant’s then-existing mental or emotional condition (such as fear), but not statements of memory or belief offered to prove past acts; trial courts may admit such evidence when relevant and not unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403.
- Trial courts have broad discretion over admissibility of impeachment evidence and may exclude materials that are minimally probative, confusing, cumulative, or offered as a substitute narrative rather than targeted impeachment.
- Admission of expert testimony on eyewitness identification is not required; under Rule 702, the trial court may exclude it if it would not assist the jury or would risk confusion.
- An improper reference to a polygraph does not require mistrial where the reference is brief, results are not admitted, and a curative instruction reasonably addresses potential prejudice.

## Conclusion

The First Circuit upheld a § 2119(3) carjacking-resulting-in-death conviction based on substantial circumstantial evidence of intent and affirmed evidentiary and trial-management rulings, including admission of victim state-of-mind statements, exclusion of defense tapes and an eyewitness-identification expert, and denial of mistrial after a brief polygraph reference.


United States v. Rodríguez-Berríos, 573 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2009)